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Abstract in English 
The Market Abuse Directive came into effect on 1 October 2005. One of its purposes is to 
reduce illegal insider trading and leakage of information prior to official releases by 
increasing penalties. Applying an event study approach to a dataset of almost 5,000 corporate 
news announcements, the analysis reveals that the information value of announcements, 
measured by the announcement day abnormal return and abnormal volume, is not 
significantly different after the new regulation than it was before although the number of 
releases has increased significantly. Trading suspicious of illegal insider trading and leakage 
of information, measured in terms of cumulative average abnormal returns and volumes for 
the 30 days prior to the news announcement, has significantly declined for small 
capitalization firms, for announcements containing information about alliances and mergers 
and acquisitions and for firms in the technology sector. 
 
Key words: Market abuse, insider trading 
 
JEL code: G14 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
Op 1 oktober 2005 is de richtlijn Marktmisbruik van kracht geworden. De bedoeling is te 
komen tot een betere bescherming van de marktintegriteit. Deze studie kijkt of de invoering 
van de richtlijn tot een schonere markt heeft geleid. De analyse richt zich op het vergelijken 
van abnormale koersfluctuaties en handelsvolumes rondom bijna 5000 persberichten. De 
conclusie van deze studie is dat de markt schoner is geworden na invoering van de richtlijn 
Marktmisbruik. De nieuwe toezichtrichtlijn is dus effectiever in het bestrijden van 
marktmisbruik dan de vorige regelgeving. Tegelijkertijd is de hoeveelheid informatie per 
persbericht niet afgenomen ondanks het feit dat de markt schoner is geworden en er meer 
berichten zijn gepubliceerd. Dit is dus een netto efficiëntere informatievoorziening en een 
verhoging van de marktintegriteit. 
 
Een korte Nederlandstalige versie van dit paper is eerder gepubliceerd in een uitgave van ESB 
(jaargang 92, nr. 4518, blz. 564-566, 21 september 2007) onder de titel “Schonere 
aandelenmarkt door richtlijn Marktmisbruik”. 
 
Steekwoorden: marktmisbruik, handel met voorwetenschap 
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As  of  1  October  2005,  the  Market  Abuse  Directive  (MAD)  is  in  effect.  This  set  of 
regulations  concerns  the  publication  of  price  sensitive  information  by  firms  listed  on  the 
Amsterdam  stock  market.  Firms  are  obliged  to  publicly  disclose  information,  which  is 
considered to have an effect on the stock price of its listing. The most prominent change of 
MAD is that penalties for insider trading have been increased substantially. In addition, the 
supervision  of  the  publication  of  price  sensitive  information  has  been  transferred  from 
Euronext Amsterdam to the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM). 
The aim of this research is twofold. First, it investigates the effects of MAD on the extent 
of stock market behaviour prior to corporate news announcements, which is suspicious of 
illegal insider trading. One purpose of MAD is to increase market integrity and confidence. 
This can be achieved by making the market “cleaner”. So, the first question is whether or not 
MAD succeeded in decreasing the prevalence of illegal insider trading on the Amsterdam 
stock  market.  Second,  it  investigates  a  change  in  the  general  information  level  of 
announcements due to the change in regulation. In fear of sanctions from a tough regulator for 
withholding information from the market, firms may just publish as much information as 
possible, regardless of whether the news is relevant. So, the second question is whether the 
information content of corporate news announcements has changed after MAD. 
The  economic  literature  has  little  to  say  about  the  effectiveness  of  insider  trading 
regulation in the Netherlands. Kabir and Vermaelen (1996) examine the effects of regulation 
introduced in 1987 restricting insider trading in Amsterdam and indicate that although trading 
by insiders did decrease in the restricted period, overall liquidity decreased as well, which is 
not a desired effect of the regulation.  
We  examine  the  research  questions  using  a  set  of  almost  5,000  corporate  news 
announcements,  alongside  stock  prices  and  volumes.  Using  an  event  study  approach,  the 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that the cumulative average abnormal returns and 
volumes prior to the date of news announcements are lower after MAD. This indicates that 
illegal insider trading is less prevalent under the new directive, but still present. The second 
question, that average abnormal returns and volumes on the announcement day have changed 
under MAD, is rejected. Although the data show that the number of announcements released 
by  firms  is  larger  after  the  new  regulation,  the  average  information  content  of  these 
                                                 
* We benefited from the comments made by seminar audiences at the Netherlands Authority for the Financial 
Markets (AFM) and the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in Britain; and from very useful suggestions by two 
referees, Arnoud Boot and Hans Degryse to improve the paper.   
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announcements has not decreased. If anything, it seems to have increased slightly, although 
not significantly so. The results suggest that MAD has made markets cleaner, but not at the 
expense  of  information  overload.  So,  overall  efficiency  seems  to  have  increased  in  the 
Amsterdam stock market after the introduction of new legislation. 
Previous event studies often focus on large frequently traded firms, given that data on 
these firms is more easily available. The impact of insider trading regulation might however 
depend on firm size too. Elliott, Morse, and Richardson (1984) note that smaller firms are not 
followed so closely by analysts, which might give insiders more opportunities to reap benefits 
by trading on inside information. For this reason, the analyses in this paper are also applied to 
sub-samples,  which  are  divided  by  capitalization  size.  The  Amsterdam  stock  exchange 
contains three size classes. The results from these analyses show that small capitalization 
firms drive much of the effects shown for the total sample. MAD does not seem to have 
altered stock market behaviour surrounding news announcements for larger firms. Dividing 
the market into different industries suggests that especially the technology sector has become 
cleaner, with no significant changes found for the other sectors. 
The literature shows a large diversity in the way the impact of changes in insider trading 
regulation is estimated. Different types of corporate news announcements are used. Different 
types of news may have different characteristics influencing market behaviour in different 
ways; the effects of regulation may also differ along this dimension. This research uses data 
containing various types of announcements, allowing to distinguish the effects of MAD by 
announcement type.  The  effects  are  shown  to  be  strongest  for  announcements  containing 
news  on  alliances,  takeovers  and  mergers  and  acquisitions.  The  apparent  leakage  of 
information prior to the announcement date in terms of pre-announcement run-up in prices 
and volumes has significantly decreased after MAD is in effect.  
Finally,  previous  work  on  stock  market  behaviour  surrounding  news  announcements 
often uses absolute returns to explain and find patterns of illegal insider trading, whereas 
making a distinction between bad news and good news allows for a comparison between the 
magnitude  of  the  price  reaction  to  bad  news  announcements  and  that  of  good  news 
announcements. The results show that the market has become cleaner especially in the bad 
news  segment,  which  suggests  that  bad  news  messages  have  been  published  sooner  after 
MAD is in effect.  
This paper is set up as follows. The next section describes the changes in market abuse 
regulation  in  the  Netherlands.  The  approach  of  estimating  the  effects  on  stock  market 
behaviour  is  explained  in  Section  3.  Section  4 describes  the  data  and  gives  a  number  of  
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descriptive statistics. Section 5 reports the main results of the analysis. Section 6 shows the 
robustness of the estimates and Section 7 discusses the findings and concludes. 
 
2. Background 
The  Act  on  the  Supervision  of  the  Securities  Trade  1995  (WTE)  is  the  principal  act 
governing the supervision carried out by the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets 
(AFM). The WTE provides that the AFM can exercise supervision by means of statutory 
powers  to  carry  out  investigations  and  inspections,  monitor  compliance  and  obtain 
information that are laid down in the act. As of 1 October 2005, the Market Abuse Directive 
(MAD) is incorporated in the Netherlands into the WTE (Articles 45-47) and the Market 
Abuse Decree. The aim is to sharpen, expand, and harmonize the existing European regime 
and to achieve improved protection for market integrity within Europe.  
The results of the implementation of MAD are an expansion of the prohibition against 
market manipulation and the transfer of the supervision of the publication of price-sensitive 
information by listed companies from Euronext Amsterdam (previously dictated by rule 28h 
of the Fondsenreglement) to the AFM. Additionally, a transparency regime for publicists of 
investment  recommendations  and  a  requirement  for  securities  institutions  to  report  a 
reasonable suspicion of trading with insider information or market manipulation (the so-called 
klikplicht)  have  been  introduced.  Finally,  the  existing  provisions  regarding  trading  with 
insider information, the reporting requirement for “insiders” and the insider regulations are 
adapted with respect to the prior legislation. 
The  rulemaking  contains  the  requirement  for  issuing  companies  whose  securities  are 
admitted to trading on a regulated market in the Netherlands, to immediately (i.e., without 
delay)  publish  price-sensitive  information.  The  publication  of  price-sensitive  information 
should occur through the publication of a press release. It is the responsibility of the issuing 
company to determine the best practice for an immediate and simultaneous (accessible to all) 
publication  of  its  price-sensitive  information.  Price-sensitive  information  should  be  made 
public in such a way that it is immediately available for everyone such that it is possible for 
investors to assess whether the information is complete, correct, and timely. The AFM is the 
authority for the supervision of the publication of price-sensitive information and will receive 
the press releases at the time of publication. The AFM does not review or approve the press 
releases before publication. The AFM does retrospectively evaluate whether investors have 
been accurately, timely, and completely informed. 
Trading  in  securities  using insider  information  damages  the  confidence  in  the  proper  
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working  of  the  securities  markets  because  the  one  who  trades  upon  the  basis  of  such 
information has an unjustified advantage over other investors. To guarantee the confidence of 
investors  it  is  important  to  provide  adequate  regulation  to  prevent  the  use  of  insider 
information. Trading with the use of insider information is a serious offence and is prohibited 
for everyone. To this end, the AFM closely follows conduct and transactions in financial 
markets.  If  trading  is  determined  to  be  in  violation  of  the  prohibition,  a  criminal  or 
administrative sanction will follow. The prohibition is set down in Article 46(1) and (3) of the 
WTE. The prohibition is directed at everyone but recognizes a distinction between so-called 
“primary insiders” such as directors and member of the supervisory board of directors of an 
issuing institution and “secondary insiders” (everyone else).  
Market  manipulation  is  forbidden  by  Article  46b,  paragraph  1  and  consists  of  four 
sections.  It is  forbidden to (i)  execute or bring about a transaction or  place  and order in 
securities by which an incorrect or misleading signal is relayed regarding the offer or bid 
price of the securities; (ii) execute or bring about a transaction or place and order in securities 
in order to maintain the price of the securities at an artificial level; (iii) execute or bring about 
a transaction or place and order in securities in which deception or misleading is made use of; 
and (iv) spread information from which an incorrect or misleading signal is relayed regarding 
the offer or bid price of the securities while the spreader knows or reasonably should know 
that the information is incorrect or misleading.  
The scope of the prohibition against market manipulation is very broad. Manipulation is 
forbidden in or from the Netherlands. It is also forbidden to manipulate the market outside of 
Europe  in  securities,  which  are  admitted  to  trading  on  a  regulated  market  located  or 
functioning  in  the  Netherlands.  It  does  not  matter  whether  the  transaction  occurs  via  the 
system of a regulated market or outside of it. 
The legislation includes the requirement for securities institutions to immediately report 
trading, which is reasonably suspicious of insider trading or market abuse to the AFM. This 
provision has a preventive character: if people are aware that “suspicious” transactions will be 
notified  by  those  with  the  reporting  obligation  then  this  will  have  the  potential  effect  of 
deterring people from performing such transactions. Additionally, such notifications support 
the supervisor in its supervision of market manipulation, which in turn contributes to the 
confidence of investors in the financial markets. The reporting duty applies only to securities 
institutions as defined in the WTE who have a reasonable suspicion that a transaction or an 
order, for which it in or from the Netherlands transacts, is in violation of the prohibition 
against insider trading or market manipulation. The securities institution does not have to  
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prove  that  there  actually  was  insider  trading  or  market  manipulation  in  order  to  make  a 
notification. The reporting duty concerns license holders as well as those who are exempted 
from the licensing requirement. The reporting duty rests upon the institution itself. Within the 
institution, the reporting duty is directed at individuals who perform securities transactions as 
part of their employment. 
 
3. Approach 
We focus on changes in the information content of press releases by quoted companies 
before  and  after  MAD.  MAD  could  have  led  to  a  change  in  behaviour  concerning  the 
treatment of information by companies quoted on the stock exchange. Such possible changes 
allow  us  to  investigate  whether  the  information  content  of  publications  of  price-sensitive 
information has changed since 1 October 2005. MAD is assumed to be an exogenous event 
with  no  changing  behaviour  prior  to  the  switch. We  need  this  assumption  to  carry  out  a 
statistical analysis in which MAD serves as a watershed. In the process of implementation 
markets  were  informed  of  its  contents  by  consultation  meetings  with  the  regulator.  This 
process  took  place  during  the  spring  and  summer  of  2005.  An  important  aspect  of  our 
assumption is that we do not want anticipation effects to blur the analysis. It could be the case 
that firms already changed their behaviour prior to the implementation. Below, in Figure 1, 
we document that the number of press releases went up after the introduction of MAD but that 
this  effect  seems  to  fade  away  after  about  six months.  Looking  at  the  raw  data  we  only 
observe a rise in the number of press releases after implementation and not an increase before 
MAD became effective.  
Press releases contain information. This information is released because of the possibility 
that  not  all  market  parties  have  available  valuable  facts  about  issuing  companies  whose 
securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market in the Netherlands. In a clean market 
abnormal trading returns or volumes should not precede unexpected press releases. Other 
press  releases,  such  as  the  upcoming  publication  of  annual  returns,  might  be  subject  to 
speculation in the market and show a pattern of abnormal returns in the period before its 
release, even in a clean market. 
 
3.1. Market model 
There are a number of approaches that can be applied to calculate returns: statistical and 
economic models. The statistical models are most widely used in the current event study 
literature, and they follow from statistical assumptions about the behaviour of stock market  
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returns with hardly any dependence on economic arguments. The potential advantage from 
applying economic models is to be able to calculate the normal returns more precisely by 
adding economic restrictions. 
Two statistical models are the constant mean return model and the factor model (e.g., 
MacKinlay,  1997).  Using  daily  stock  prices,  the  constant  mean  return  model  defines  the 
expected  return  of  a  security  to  be  the  average  of  the  daily  returns  over  the  estimation 
window.  Factor  models  are  applied  to  reduce  the  variance  of  the  abnormal  return  by 
explaining more of the variance in the normal return. A commonly used factor model is the 
market  model,  which  relates  the  return  of  a  security  to  the  return  of  its  relevant  market 
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where  t i P,  is the closing price for security i on day t.  
The market model is represented by 
t i t M i i t i R R , , , ε β α + + = ,                        (2) 
where  t i R ,  and  t M R ,  are the period-t returns of security i and the market portfolio M;  i α  and 
i β  are the market model parameters and  t i, ε is the error term which has an expected value of 
zero. The market model is a one-factor model, whereas other factor models may use multiple 
factors to further reduce variation in the normal returns. One such example is the use of 
industry indexes in addition to the market index.  
To  improve  the  fit  of  the  normal  return  equation,  we  use  the  return  of  the  relevant 
capitalization  index  as  the  relevant  market  portfolio,  rather  than  the  index  for  the  entire 
Amsterdam stock exchange. This means our market model for normal returns is represented 
by 
t i t C i i t i R R , , , ε β α + + = ,                        (3) 
where  t i R ,  is  the  return  on  security  i  for  at  time  t  and  t C R ,  is  the  return  on  the  relevant 
capitalization  index  C  at  time  t.  The  expected  normal  return  is  estimated  over  a  given 
estimation window for each announcement separately, meaning that α  and β  are estimated 
for  each  news  announcement.  Announcements  are  considered  firm  specific,  so  each 
announcement is associated with the returns of the security that released it. The estimated 
abnormal return is then:  
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) ˆ ˆ ( , , , t C j j t j t j R R AR β α + − = ,                      (4) 
where  t j AR ,  is the abnormal return for announcement j at time t, where the returns are those 
of the security releasing announcement j. Thus,  j α ˆ  and  j β ˆ  are the estimates of the market 
model  parameters  for  announcement  j.  Time  t  is  here  relative  to  the  date  of  the  news 
announcement, with  0 t =  being the announcement day. 
To derive conclusions about the effects of certain events, the abnormal returns must be 
aggregated.  This  aggregation  has  to  occur  along  two  dimensions.  Firstly,  across  time  to 
compute cumulative abnormal returns to make a judgement about possible insider trading 
within a given time period and secondly, across securities to make a judgment about a change 
in  investor  behaviour  in  the  market  as  a  whole.  For  each  announcement  the  cumulative 
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To investigate the effect of the change in market abuse regulation market wide, the CARs of 
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where a and b are the start and the end of the period over which the pre-announcement stock 
market behaviour is to be evaluated. 
Once  this  aggregation  has  taken  place,  a  single  measure  for  the  cumulative  average 
abnormal return (CAAR) over the period of interest remains, for which the significance can be 
tested using the t-statistic 
), 1 , 0 ( ~






tCAAR =                     (7) 
where a and b are the start and the end of the period over which the pre-announcement stock 
market behaviour has to be evaluated.  
The reaction of volumes around the release of a news announcement is estimated along 
similar lines. Wong (2002) and Monteiro, Zaman, and Leitterstorf (2007) extensively describe 
how normal volumes and thus abnormal volumes have to be calculated. The main differences 
are  adjustments  for  first  order  serial  correlation  and  day-of-the-week  effects,  after  which 
volume can be assumed to be approximately normally distributed, which allows for the same  
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significance  test  as  is  applied  to  the  abnormal  returns.  Day-of-the-week  dummies  are 
incorporated in the model due to the anomaly documented in the literature that stock market 
volume is dependent on the day of the week (e.g., Berument, Inamlik, and Kiymaz, 2004; 
Berument and Kiymaz, 2001; Kiymaz and Berument, 2003). So, first the natural logarithm is 
taken of the volume traded on day t, and regressors are included to control for weekdays. 
Expected volume is then estimated for each announcement, which gives the abnormal volume 
(AV).  The  cumulative  abnormal  volume  is  then  calculated  for  each  announcement  by 
summing up average volumes for the period of interest. This leads to similar equations as 
documented for returns. 
The  increase  in  the  cumulative  average  abnormal  return  and  cumulative  average 
abnormal volumes prior to the announcement date are common instruments to measure the 
extent of information leakage and illegal insider trading. This leads to the first hypothesis, 
which will be tested in this paper: (Hypothesis 1:) The expected absolute cumulative average 
abnormal  return/volume  prior  to  corporate  news  announcements  is  smaller  after  the 
implementation of MAD. 
MAD may also lead firms to release information to the public, which they would not 
release without it. This is a desired result if this information is price relevant, which decreases 
the information asymmetry in the market and gives investors more equal opportunities on the 
stock market. Tighter rules and regulations might on the other hand be termed as ‘regulatory 
overkill’ (e.g., Kabir and Vermaelen, 1996). The new regulation might lead firms to publish 
all information, including information, which is not price relevant.  In this case, investors 
might  be  overloaded  with  information,  making  the  market  less  efficient.  If  firms  indeed 
publish  less  informative  announcements,  the  average  price  and  volume  reaction  after  the 
announcement date will be lower. This leads to the second hypothesis that will be investigated 
in this paper: (Hypothesis 2:) The expected absolute average abnormal return/volume after 
corporate news announcements is smaller after the implementation of MAD. 
 
3.2. Estimation and event window 
For  the  model  to  have  predictive  power,  α  and  β  have  to  be  estimated  using  a 
sufficiently large number of days. There is a payoff between adding predictive power and 
losing data. The larger the estimation window, the more news announcements will not be able 
to be used because not enough data for the securities is available. On the other hand, if the 
estimation window is too small, there is not much predictive power in the model. The choice 
of the length of the estimation window used in the event study literature covers a range of  
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approaches. Observed lengths are 240 trading days (Brown and Warner, 1985; Monteiro et al., 
2007), 150 trading days (Meulbroek, 1992; Sanders and Zdanowicz, 1992), and 100 trading 
days  (Kabir  and  Vermaelen,  1996;  Keown  and  Pinkerton,  1981).  We  use  an  estimation 
window of 120 trading days. This length of the estimation window is also used by Wong 
(2002) and proposed by MacKinlay (1997). 
A  second  issue  is  the  timing  of  the  estimation  window.  This  timing  depends  on  the 
decision as to what confines the event window. Sanders and Zdanowicz (1992) note that pre-
announcement average abnormal returns are measured over time periods varying from 10 to 
60 days. Which period is considered to be likely to be influenced by information leakage and 
illegal insider trading influences the period that should be used to estimate the market model 
parameters. Similar to Keown and Pinkerton (1981) – who base their choice to exclude the 25 
trading days preceding the news announcement on results of Halpern (1973) – the impact of 
the  market  reaction  to  the  announcement  on  the  market  model  parameters  is  taken  into 
account by excluding the 30 trading days prior to the press release. Thus, the analyses are 
based on a model for which the parameters have been estimated using an estimation window 
of 120 trading days, from  150 t = −  to and including  30 t = − , where  0 t =  is the day of the 
news announcement. 
After establishing the extent to which prices and volumes react abnormally relative to the 
market  around  the  publication  of  a  news  announcement,  it  is  important  to  determine  the 
timing of this reaction and whether the change in regulation as of 1 October 2005 alters this 
timing. As Keown and Pinkerton (1981) point out, Halpern (1973) finds that 58 percent of the 
price movement occurs one month prior to the announcement date. We evaluate the absolute 
CAAR  and  the  CAAV  over  the  period  30 t = − to  1 t = − ,  where  0 t =  is  the  day  of  the 
announcement. In sum, (ab)normal returns are estimated using an estimation window of 120 
trading days, starting 30 trading days prior to the release of the announcement. The 30 days 




                                                 
1 Halpern (1973) finds that as much as half of the price movement occurs two months prior to 
the announcement date. Although the period prior to 30 days before the announcement date is 
included in the regression analysis as part of estimation window, a second measure is the 
absolute  CAAR  and  the  CAAV  for  the  60-day  pre-announcement  period  from  60 t = −  to 
1 t = − . The results using this 60-day pre-announcement period are generally similar to those 
looking at the 30-day pre-announcement period, and are  available from the authors upon 
request.  
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3.3. Bad news and good news 
A  contribution  of  this  paper  to  the  existing  literature  is  to  provide  insights  in  the 
difference in price and volume reaction between bad news announcements and good news 
announcements.  
The difficulty here lies in the decision how to make the distinction between these two 
categories. Wong (2002) distinguishes bad news from good news by the sign of the return 
after  a  news  announcement.  There  are  two  problems  with  this  definition:  illegal  insider 
trading  and  market  anticipation.  If  illegal  insider  trading  is  a  relevant  problem,  the 
information within the announcement is already – at least partially – digested by the market 
prior to its official release. This takes place because insiders in possession of this information 
use their knowledge and trade on it prior to it being released to the market. The market also 
recognizes this informed trading and follows these movements (Meulbroek, 1992). In addition 
to recognition of informed trading, the market may anticipate certain announcements. For 
these reasons, the price change after an announcement might lead to misspecification of an 
announcement in terms of it being bad or good news. Therefore the distinction between bad 
and good news announcements is made by looking at the price change around the date of the 
announcement. An announcement is defined as good news if the cumulative abnormal return 
of the period  5 t = − up to and including  4 t = is larger or equal to zero. In the case this CAR is 
negative, the announcement is considered bad news. Using Wong’s (2002) definition of good 
and bad news does not alter the main conclusions; the results of using this approach are 
available upon request. 
 
4. Data and descriptive statistics 
This section introduces the data we use for the empirical analysis and presents the most 
salient statistics. In Appendix I and II more detailed information about the data can be found. 
 
4.1. Data 
This paper applies an event study approach to the effects of the change in market abuse 
regulation on 1 October 2005. Thus this date – the event date – forms the midpoint of the 
period to be investigated. New regulation regarding market abuse and market manipulation 
most recently became effective on 1 January 2007. To prevent the results of the analyses in 
this paper to be affected by this new set of rules and regulations, the post-event period ends on 
31 December 2006. To make the pre-event period comparable to the post-event period, the 
same length of time is used for both periods, meaning this study is based on data from 15  
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months prior to the change in legislation and 15 months after the change. 
Corporate news announcements for the period from 1 July 2004 to 31 December 2006 for 
listings on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange are collected from the publicly accessible online 
corporate news database of NYSE Euronext. Given that this paper also wishes to evaluate the 
changes in market behaviour by firm size, announcements are collected by NYSE Euronext’s 
compartment division: compartment A (Large Caps, 5,398 announcements), compartment B 
(Mid Caps, 2,736 announcements), and compartment C (Small Caps, 2,171 announcements). 
All announcements published after 5pm are considered as announcements published on the 
next trading day. 
Daily closing prices and trading volumes for the securities releasing news announcements 
are collected using Thomson One. The daily closing prices for the cap and industry indices 
used to obtain the abnormal returns are also obtained from Thomson One. All non-trading 
days are removed from the data. Then, for every security, all days for which no return can be 
calculated are removed. The next step is to remove those announcements for which too little 
data is available. For the abnormal returns analysis daily returns are needed for the period 
from  150  days  prior  to  the  announcement  to  30  days  prior  to  the  announcement.  All 
announcements  for  which  there  are  less  than  120  observed  returns  in  this  period  are 
eliminated from the dataset. After this selection process 5,168 announcements remain, of 
which 2,747 by large capitalization firms, 1,749 by mid cap firms, and 672 by small cap 
firms. Since extreme values and outliers may heavily influence the results of the analysis, the 
dataset is further cleaned. All announcements by the IT service group Getronics are removed, 
since the results for Getronics are heavily influenced by a stock split in May 2005. As a last 
step, all announcements with an abnormal return in the period  60 t = −  to  5 t =  larger than or 
equal to 20 percent are removed from the dataset, resulting in the  final dataset of 4,979 
announcements. 
The problem with estimating abnormal volumes is that for the indices volumes are not 
recorded. Therefore, volume indices have to be constructed. Since the analysis uses cap size 
as a group-defining characteristic, three volume indices are created: large cap volume, mid 
cap volume, and small cap volume. The approach here is to simply add the daily volumes of 
large cap securities for each calendar date, resulting in a measure for daily market volume for 
large caps. The same process is used to create a mid cap and a small cap market volume 
measure.  In  doing  so,  only  the  securities  remaining  in  the  final  dataset  are  considered. 
Furthermore, since firms do not remain unchanged in terms of cap size, the decision needs to 
be made in which market volume index a security should be included. The criterion used here  
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is to include the daily volume of a security in the index if the share of the total amount of 
announcements published by a firm between 1 July 2004 and 31 December 2006 within the 
relevant cap size is larger than 95 percent. 
  
4.2. Descriptive statistics 
The final dataset contains 4,979 announcements released by 124 securities over the period 
from 1 July 2004 to 31 December 2006. Table 1 shows the composition of this dataset by cap 
size (large, mid and small) and period (before or after MAD). A Pearson’s chi-square test for 
independence,  with  a  p-value  smaller  than  0.01,  does  not  allow  the  hypothesis  of  no 
relationship to be rejected. This indicates that there is a relationship between the period and 
the number of corporate news announcements released by the different capitalization groups. 
Where  prior  to  MAD  the  large  caps  account  for  51  percent  of  all  announcements,  this 
percentage  is  57  percent  afterwards.  Besides  the  change  in  the  distribution  of  total 
announcements by cap size, it is also clear that after MAD came into effect a larger number of 
announcements have been published period (2,875 vs. 2,104). This also holds for the three 
cap size groups separately. 
A similar observation has already been documented by the AFM (2007) in a report that 
looks at the period of one year after the regulatory change. In a comparison of the number of 
announcements per month, the report shows that in the first months following the introduction 
of MAD the number of press releases is larger than in the same month the year before. 
Figure 1 depicts a similar trend looking at announcements published per calendar week. 
The first of October 2005 is a Saturday, with Monday 3 October 2005 being the start of week 
41  of  the  year  2005,  which  is  the  first  week  the  MAD  was  in  effect.  The  number  of 
announcements in this week is compared to the number of announcements in week 41 of 
2004. Such a comparison is made for all weeks up to comparing week 40 of 2006 to week 40 
of  2005.  To  smooth  out  the  volatility  in  weekly  announcements,  the  numbers  have  been 
averaged over three weeks. Figure 1 depicts the difference in the three-week moving averages 
of  the  post-  and  pre-MAD  period.  Figure  1  shows  that  the  number  of  announcements 
published in each week are higher after MAD comes into effect. This difference is largest in 
the first weeks and months after the introduction of MAD. The difference only drops below 
zero after week 17, which is the average number of announcements for the weeks 15, 16, and 
17 of 2006 minus the average number of announcements for the weeks 15, 16, and 17 of 
2005.  Similar  to  the  conclusions  in  the  report  by  the  AFM  (2007),  firms  publish  more 
announcements up to half a year after MAD becomes effective.  
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To investigate whether the increase in total number of announcements can be said to be a 
result of the change in the market abuse regulation, a similar overview to Table 1 – at the 
level of single securities – is given in Table A1 in Appendix I. Performing a paired sample t-
test on those securities that have a positive number of announcements in both supervisor 
periods yields an untabulated mean increase of 3.05 in the number of announcements posted 
by a single security during the 15 months after MAD, compared to the 15 months prior to 
MAD. This difference is significant at the 5 percent level. If the amount of news related to a 
firm that influences stock prices is assumed to be constant over time, at least over the total 
sample  of  securities,  this  difference  supports  the  suspicion  that  firms  release  more 
announcements  probably  in  fear  of  sanctions  after  MAD,  regardless  of  the  news 
announcements  containing  relevant  information  or  not.  Table  A2  documents  which 
companies are included in which index. 
In the literature on insider trading and insider trading laws, different types of corporate 
announcements are used to investigate the extent of illegal insider trading. Announcements in 
the database of company news are divided into a number of topics. Most announcements are 
classified by several topics. All combinations of topics are subdivided into nine different 
announcement  categories.  Table  2  denotes  the  number  of  announcements  within  each 
category,  in  total  and  before  and  after  MAD.  Performing  Pearson’s  chi-square  test  of 
independence indicates that the share of total announcements of a certain announcement type 
is not independent of the change in regulation. The null hypothesis of no association between 
announcement type and regulation is rejected at the 1 percent level. Table A3 in Appendix II 
shows a detailed overview of the categorisation of news types. 
With the dependence between periods and cap size on the one hand and between period 
and announcement type on the other hand, it is appropriate to divide the dataset along these 
dimensions and to perform the analyses separately for the three cap sizes and the different 
announcement types. As noted above, another dimension that might influence the results of 
the analyses is the day of the week an announcement is published. Table 3 reports the number 
of announcements by weekday and by period. The value of a Pearson’s chi-square test is 2.35, 
which is associated with a probability of 0.67. Thus the hypothesis of independence between 
supervisor and number of announcements by weekday cannot be rejected and it is therefore 
not  necessary  to  take  account  of  the  weekday  an  announcement  is  released  on,  when 
evaluating the effects of MAD. 
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5. Results 
This section presents the results of the effectiveness of MAD. It first shows an analysis of 
abnormal returns and volumes. Thereafter results by type of announcement and industry are 
shown. 
 
5.1. Abnormal returns 
The development of abnormal returns is plotted in Figure 2. Plot A shows that the trend in 
the CAAR for good news announcements is similar under both regimes, whereas the CAAR for 
bad news announcements before MAD falls below that of the post-implementation period as 
early as 12 days prior to the announcement. Looking at firm size, Plot B for the large caps 
shows contradicting trends. For good news announcements it seems that the CAAR for AFM 
is  higher  than  that  for  Euronext,  yet  the  absolute  CAAR  for  bad  news  announcements  is 
smaller for AFM than for Euronext. The opposite picture is shown in Plot C for the mid caps. 
The difference in the development of the CAAR prior to the announcement date is in line with 
a cleaner market after MAD for good news announcements, yet contradicting it for bad news 
announcements. 
The most pronounced differences between the two regimes in terms of pre-announcement 
CAAR trends are visible in Plot D for announcements by small firms. There is no difference 
between  the  two  regimes  looking  at  the  plots  for  good  news  announcements,  with  both 
CAARs fluctuating around zero until 5 days prior to the announcement date. However, the 
absolute  average  abnormal  returns  for  bad  news  announcements  are  much  larger  under 
Euronext than under AFM. The CAAR for AFM remains around zero until  5 t = − , whereas 
the plot for Euronext drops below that for AFM as early as 28 days prior to the press release, 
with the difference increasing. 
Table  4  gives  the  statistics  related  to  Figure  2  and  reports  the  cumulative  average 
abnormal returns (CAARs) for various sub-samples of the data for several periods around the 
publication  of  the  announcement.  “30-day  run-up”  is  the  CAAR  for  the  30-day  period 
preceding the announcement (from  30 t = −  to  1 t = − ). Similarly, “5-day run-up” is the CAAR 
for the 5-day pre-announcement period from  5 t = −  to  1 t = − . “day 0 aar” is the average 
abnormal return on the day of the announcement ( 0) t = . Finally, “5-day post caar” is the 
CAAR for the 5 days after the announcement ( 0 t =  to  4 t = ). The means and differences are 
given for the entire sample (TOTAL) as well as for the announcements categorized by firm 
size  (LARGE  CAPS,  MID  CAPS,  SMALL  CAPS).  Panel  A  contains  the  results  for  
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announcements considered to be bad news, whereas Panel B contains the results for good 
news announcements. The standard errors are reported in italics. 
Looking at the total sample, for both good and bad news announcements, the run-up 
CAAR  is  significant  for  both  pre-announcement  periods  (5-day  and  30-day  run-up),  both 
before and after MAD. For good news announcements, the difference between the CAARs of 
the  two  regimes  is  not  significantly  different  from  zero.  However,  for  bad  news 
announcements the absolute CAAR is significantly larger before MAD for the 30-day run-up. 
This indicates that MAD has led to a more efficient market. 
Looking at firm size, the results for large capitalization firms are ambiguous. For bad 
news announcements the absolute pre-announcement CAAR is larger before MAD, whereas 
for good news announcements, the 30-day run-up is significantly larger after MAD, which in 
turn would indicate a less efficient market. For mid caps, the differences are insignificant for 
bad news announcements, whereas they are significant (and have the expected sign) for good 
news announcements. The results for small capitalization firms (SMALL CAPS) are in line 
with those for the entire sample. There is no significant difference between the CAAR of both 
regimes for good news announcements, yet for bad news announcements, the absolute pre-
announcement  CAAR  before  MAD  is  significantly  larger  than  afterwards.  Comparing  the 
statistically  insignificant  mean  30-day  run-up  CAR  of  −0.67  percent  after  MAD  with  the 
highly significant −5.93 percent before MAD, the hypothesis that the CAAR is smaller after 
MAD cannot be rejected (with the difference of −5.26 percent being significant  at the 1 
percent level).  
In sum, for large caps and mid caps there is no clear-cut change in the pre-announcement 
CAAR after MAD. Nevertheless, MAD has had an effect on the abnormal returns prior to 
press releases of the small caps. The pre-announcement run-up for bad news announcements 
has  decreased  and  is  no  longer  significantly  different  from  zero,  suggesting  a  change  in 
market behaviour, and providing support for Hypothesis 1. 
Looking at the effect of the change in the market abuse regulation on the news value of 
announcements, the average abnormal return on the announcement day can be used as a proxy 
for the information content of the announcement. The results in Table 4 show that differences 
in the day zero average abnormal returns are insignificant. If anything, the results seems to 
provide support for a hypothesis that announcements are more informative after MAD, since 
seven  out  of  eight  differences  in  the  absolute  announcement  day  AAR  are  negative. 
Hypothesis 2 is thus rejected. 
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5.2. Abnormal volumes 
Even though price reactions provide important insights in the effects of the release of new 
information around the date of the announcement, trading on share relevant information might 
not  be  seen  in  price  changes  if  the  information  is  not  public.  If  an  individual  possesses 
information which leads him/her to believe a certain stock price is going to rise in the near 
future, and if the information is not known to or anticipated by the market as a whole, the 
transaction will not necessarily lead to an increase in the price of the stock. Insider trading 
might then only be discovered when examining trade volumes. 
Figure 3 and Table 5 show the results of the abnormal volumes analysis. The plots of the 
CAAVs in Figure 3 show developments similar to those observed in Figure 2 for the CAARs. 
All announcements taken together, there is  a clear jump in the CAAV  on the day of the 
announcement, which indicates that the announcements have real news value. For the total 
sample (Panel A), for bad news, the run-up in the CAAV is rather small when compared to the 
run-up in the CAAV for good news announcements, which is in line with Wong’s (2002) 
hypothesis that good news disseminates faster than bad news. Panel D for the small caps 
sample  shows  that  the  CAAV  for  bad  news  announcements  moves  around  zero  until  the 
announcement day, when a clear upward jump  is visible. For  good news announcements 
before MAD, the same trend as for the total sample is observed: a steadily increasing CAAV 
prior to the news announcement.  
Where there seems to be no clear change in the reaction of the stock market in terms of 
volume after MAD for the total sample and the mid cap sample, the effects for the large cap 
sample are not as expected. For good news announcements before MAD, a large drop in the 
CAAV is visible, whereas under AFM supervision the CAAV shows a strong increase long 
before the announcement day. This would indicate that in terms of volumes, the market for 
large caps has become less clean after MAD.  
When turning to the results for the mid caps, a strong increase in volumes is visible prior 
to the release of the news announcement. The trend in the CAAVs for mid caps have not 
changed after the MAD came into effect, yet the large run-up prior to the announcement date 
for good news in the small caps sample has disappeared after MAD. This result strengthens 
the results from the abnormal returns analysis and provides additional support for smaller 
abnormal volumes after 1 October 2005. 
The conclusions drawn from the plots in Figure 3 are confirmed by the statistics in Table 
5. For bad news, the run-up in the 30-day pre-announcement period is significant at the 5 
percent level only for the mid caps sample, with the difference between the two regimes being  
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insignificant. For good news, the 30-day run-up is positive and significant for all samples 
except for the small caps sample after MAD, where the CAAV is not significantly different 
from zero. The AAVs on the announcement day are all positive and significant at the 1 percent 
level, whereas there are no significant changes in these day-zero AAVs after the transfer of 
supervision on 1 October 2005.  
Although the results presented in Table 5 are in line with those of the abnormal returns 
analysis presented in Table 4, the volume index measures used in calculating the abnormal 
volumes  around  corporate  news  announcements  may  have  influenced  them.  Since  the 
measure for the market volume is self-constructed using the securities in the dataset, the 
results may be sensitive to changes in this measure. 
These results for the abnormal volumes analysis confirm those from the abnormal returns 
analysis.  The  effect  of  MAD  is  most  pronounced  for  small  cap  firms.  There  are  strong 
indications that for those firms, the increase in the CAAR and CAAV prior to the public release 
of an announcement has disappeared. In the case of small firms, there is strong support for 
Hypothesis  1,  suggesting  a  cleaner  and  more  efficient  market.  The  results  of  both  the 
abnormal  returns  and  abnormal  volumes  analyses  provide  no  support  for  Hypothesis  2, 
leading to the conclusion that there are no significant changes in the information content of 
news announcements. 
 
5.3. Type of announcement 
There are numerous studies on the prevalence of illegal insider trading. The analyses are 
based on stock market behaviour surrounding news announcements released by firms. The 
type of news announcement used to analyse the extent of illegal insider trading differs across 
studies. To investigate the different effects for different types of announcements, Figure 4 and 
Table  6  report  the  results  for  Alliances/M&A  announcements,  Sales  announcements, 
Commercial Operation announcements and Income announcements. 
Panels B, C and D of Figure 4 show no apparent effects of the change in market abuse 
regulation  for  sales  announcements,  commercial  operation  announcements  or  income 
announcements. The CAARs before and after MAD follow the same trends. So for these 
announcement types, there is no indication that MAD altered the market’s behaviour. The 
picture for announcements concerning alliances and mergers and acquisitions (Panel A) leads 
to a different conclusion. 
For Alliances/M&A announcements the plots in Panel A of Figure 4 show that the price 
reaction to good news before MAD is apparent long before the official announcement at day  
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0 t = . This run-up suggests leakage of information and illegal insider trading and is consistent 
with the literature documenting stock market behaviour surrounding M&A announcements 
(see e.g., Keown and Pinkerton, 1981; Meulbroek, 1992). This run-up is no longer visible 
after MAD, which means the results for Alliances/M&A Announcements lend support for 
Hypothesis 1, consistent with a cleaner market after MAD. 
The results shown in Table 6 confirm these observations, with the 30-day run-up for bad 
news Alliances/M&A announcements being insignificant after MAD, whereas it is positive 
and significant before. Having a closer look at the AARs on the day of the announcement, the 
day zero absolute average abnormal returns are significantly larger after MAD for income 
announcements and for sales announcements containing good news, meaning these events 
contain more information than similar announcements did before. When taking into account 
the type of announcement, Hypothesis 2 is again rejected. 
 
5.4. Results by industry 
Figure 5 and Table 7 report the results of the abnormal returns analysis for different 
industries. The plots in Figure 5 show that for Consumer Goods, Consumer Services and 
Financials, MAD has not changed the stock market behaviour around the publication of an 
announcement. For Industrials (Panel A) it seems that for bad news announcements, the price 
reaction  prior  to  an  announcement  has  become  larger  after  the  change  in  market  abuse 
regulation. For Technology (Panel E), the pre-announcement run-up before MAD for bad 
news announcements is stronger than after MAD.  
Looking at the significance of these observations in Table 7, the results for the total 
sample  (Table  4)  are  only  matched  by  those  for  the  technology  industry.  For  bad  news 
announcements  released  by  firms  with  the  Industrial  Classification  Benchmark  (ICB) 
classification  Technology,  the  absolute  average  abnormal  returns  prior  to  day  zero  are 
significantly larger before MAD than they are in the period after, thus supporting Hypothesis 
1. This indicates that for the technology industry, the problem of leakage of information prior 
to an official press release has significantly decreased since MAD. For the other industries the 
difference in the 30-day run-up CAAR before and after MAD is not statistically significant. 
Looking at the announcement day AARs, news announcements do not seem to contain 
less information after the shift in regulation. All day-zero AARs are significant and have the 
expected signs, with the difference between the two regimes being not significantly different 
from zero. In sum, when the analysis is performed at the industry level, Hypothesis 2 is 
rejected, while there is strong support in favour of Hypothesis 1.  
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Looking at the results on the industry level might lead to the conclusion that the change 
in regulation has had large effects in the technology industry. This is in line with Ahmed and 
Schneible  (2007),  who  find  that  small  firms  and  high  tech  firms  drive  the  effect  of  US 
Regulation Fair Disclosure. The numbers presented in Table 8 indicate that the results for 
Technology  are  not  necessarily  driven  by  a  behavioural  change  within  the  Technology 
industry. The share of total announcements released by the technology industry that come 
from small capitalization firms is 44.5 percent. 
Looking at the results from the analysis for small cap firms (e.g., Table 4), the results for 
Technology  can  be  said  to  be  strongly  affected  by  the  underlying  behavioural  change 
observed for small capitalization firms. Table 8 then also gives and indication to why no 
effects  are  found  for  the  other  industries.  The  shares  of  announcements  made  by  small 
capitalization firms within the other industries are very small, ranging from 2.8 percent for 
Consumer Services to 11.5 percent for Financials. 
 
6. Robustness 
The results presented in the previous section might be sensitive to changes in the sample 
to which the analysis is applied, and may also be different when changes are made in the 
analysis itself. To investigate the robustness of the reported results, this section provides a 
number of checks by applying the analysis to  various subsamples and by applying some 
changes to the approach itself. Only the abnormal returns analysis is repeated here, since the 
results for the volumes analysis are less reliable when smaller samples are selected. 
 
6.1. Distinguishing good and bad news 
The  method  of  determining  whether  an  announcement  contains  good  or  bad  news  is 
subject to a number of assumptions. Wong (2002) makes a distinction between bad and good 
news announcements based on the sign of the abnormal return on the announcement day. As 
noted previously, this may be wrong and therefore the distinction in the analyses of this paper 
has been based on the CAR of the period  5 t = −  to  4 t = . To compare the previously reported 
results to Wong’s (2002) approach, the results of the analysis using the sign of the day zero 
abnormal return to define bad vs. good news are reported in Figure 6 and Table 9. 
Looking at the plots in Figure 6, the conclusions for the total sample concerning a cleaner 
market do not seem to be affected by the way bad news is distinguished from good news: 
there are no apparent differences between the two regimes. This is confirmed when looking at 
Table  9.  The  30-day  run-up  for  the  total  sample  is  insignificant,  both  for  bad  news  
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announcements and good news announcements. The differences are also insignificant. The 
absolute day zero AARs are positive and highly significant, with no differences before and 
after MAD. This would indicate that the Amsterdam stock market is clean, with no suspicion 
of information leakage or illegal insider trading. 
This  conclusion  changes  when  the  data  is  separately  analysed  for  the  different 
capitalization sizes. The results for large caps are in line with those obtained from the original 
analysis, leading to inconclusive results for large caps. For mid caps the results suggest that 
the absolute 30-day pre-announcement CAAR for bad news announcements are larger after 
MAD. The mid caps analysis with the initial approach provides slight support in favour of a 
cleaner market. The results for small caps seem to be in line with those from Table 1, where 
the  difference  in  the  30-day  run-up  for  bad  news  announcements  was  also  significant. 
However, the significant difference results here from a puzzling positive run-up after MAD.   
A positive run-up for a bad news announcement is possible if the market anticipation of 
the  content  of  the  announcement  is  not  in  line  with  the  actual  information  in  the 
announcement.  For  instance,  if  the  market  anticipates  a  positive  earnings  announcement, 
whereas it actually turns out that earnings have been lower than expected, the run-up can be 
positive, with a negative day zero abnormal return. This may be the case on the level of an 
individual announcement, but due to averaging out this observation will not occur after all 
announcements have been aggregated. There are two possible explanations for this result to 
remain visible at the aggregate level. The first is that the market’s anticipation of results is 
repeatedly  incorrect.  However,  this  explanation  assumes  that  investors  do  not  alter  their 
expectations.  If  the  market  as  a  whole  is  constantly  surprised  by  the  contents  of  an 
announcement, it will alter the ways in which expectations are formed.  
The second explanation for why this observation may occur at the aggregate level is that 
information  leakage  and  illegal  insider  trading  trouble  the  market.  If  an  announcement 
contains good news, but insiders have traded on that information prior to its official release – 
thus  leading  to  a  positive  and  significant  pre-announcement  run-up  –  a  negative 
announcement  date  abnormal  return  may  appear  if  these  insiders  (and  other  investors 
mimicking their trades) sell their stocks to cash in the profits obtained. In this case, good news 
will  be  classified  as  bad  news  when  using  the  day  zero  abnormal  return  to  make  the 
distinction. 
By basing the distinction between bad and good news on the sign of the CAR of the 10-
day period from  5 t = −  to  4 t =  (with the announcement day being  0 t = ) this problem of 
miss-specifying  good  news  as  bad  news  is  diminished,  although  it  still  remains  if  the  
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information in the announcement is fully reflected in the stock prices as early as six days prior 
to the official announcement. A second issue is the possibility that the press release obtained 
from the database is not the first announcement containing the information. It could be that 
the announcement was published sooner in other media. But again, by using the 10-day period 
to make the bad/good news distinction, the problems this issue may cause are diminished. 
Furthermore, these two problems can lead to reversed results on the announcement level, yet 
since the analyses in this paper involve averages over large numbers of announcements, the 
results are not likely to be strongly affected. 
 
6.2. Clustering 
In the case an announcement is preceded by a prior announcement by the same firm 
within the run-up period, the price reaction of this prior announcement will show up in the 
CAR of the later announcement. This gives rise to an unjustified suspicion of information 
leakage and illegal insider trading prior to the official release of the announcement. To look 
into this issue the announcements that are accompanied by another announcement by the 
same firm in the period from  5 t = −  up to and including  4 t = are excluded from the analysis. 
Since  this  reduced  sample  still  includes  announcements  that  are  preceded  by 
announcements prior to 5 days before its announcement, only the 5-day run-up is considered. 
Considering only announcements containing no other announcements in the complete period 
from  30 t = −  to  4 t =  will leave too small a sample to be able to draw reliable conclusions 
from the results. 
Table 10 shows the results for the reduced sample of unclustered announcements. The 
results for bad news announcements are in line with those obtained from the total sample, 
including the clustered announcements. The results for good news announcements show that 
the market is cleaner after MAD, whereas this was rejected when applying the analysis to the 
samples including the clustered announcements. Furthermore, there is also support for the 
idea that news announcements have become more newsworthy after the shift in supervision 
on 1 October 2005, thus rejecting Hypothesis 2. 
 
6.3. Two-factor market model 
The approach used in the previous section regresses the returns of the individual security 
on the returns of the relevant capitalization index. So for an announcement by a small cap 
firm  the  returns  of  the  firm  are  regressed  on  the  returns  of  the  AScX.  To  increase  the 
explanatory power, it may be useful to add additional explanatory variables. This section  
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discusses  changes  in  the  results  when  adding  the  returns  of  the  relevant  industry  as  an 
explanatory variable to the market model. The return for any security i at time t is now given 
by 
t i t I i t C i i t i R R R , , , , ε γ β α + + + = ,                   (14) 
where  t i R ,  is the return on security i at time t,  t C R ,  is the return on the relevant capitalization 
index C at time t, and  t I R ,  is the return on the relevant industry index I at time t. For each 
announcement this equation is then estimated with an estimation window of 120 days and the 
abnormal returns are defined as 
) ˆ ˆ ˆ ( , , , , t I j t C j j t j t j R R R AR γ β α + + − = ,                  (15) 
where  t j AR ,  is the abnormal return on announcement j at time t, where the returns are those 
of  the  security  releasing  announcement  j.  Thus,  j α ˆ ,  j β ˆ  and  j γˆ  are  the  estimates  of  the 
market model parameters for announcement j. Time t is here relative to the date of the news 
announcement, with t=0 being the announcement day.  
An estimation of the model in equation (14) will suffer from multicollinearity, since the 
return of a security is regressed both on the return of the cap index and the return of the 
industry  index.  These  two  indices  are  obviously  not  unrelated.  The  industry  indices  are 
obtained from NYSE Euronext and are based on the ICB classification. They are subsamples 
of the Amsterdam AllShares Index (AAX), as are the cap indices. The correlation between the 
cap  and  industry  indices  affects  the  interpretation  of  the  coefficients  of  the  explanatory 
variables, but as long as the relationship between the indices is stable over time, the forecast is 
still reliable. 
The  change  in  the  results  will  be  most  pronounced  for  the  results  of  the  analysis  by 
industry (Table 7), so Table 11 reports the results of the analysis using the two-factor market 
model  by  industry.  The  conclusions  from  the  results  for  Industrials,  Consumer  Goods, 
Consumer Services and Financials are the same as those from the one factor market model 
used in Section 5. The  results for the  Technology industry provide more support for the 
suspicions  formulated  earlier.  Using  the  original  one  factor  market  model  the  results  for 
Technology are consistent with a cleaner market, whereas it is suspected that the significant 
difference  is  caused  by  the  fact  that  a  large  portion  of  the  announcements  within  the 
technology sample are issued by small capitalization firms. Adding the industry index return 
to the market model improves the fit of the model. 
 To conclude this section, the results hold up to the robustness checks. First, basing the  
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distinction on the abnormal return of the announcement day does not change the conclusions 
about the changes due to the shift in supervision. However, using the day zero AR instead of 
the  CAR  of  a  period  surrounding  the  announcement,  good  news  announcements  may  be 
wrongly classified as bad news announcements.  
Second, adjusting for the issue of clustering also influences the results, in the sense that 
the market is cleaner and press releases contain the same information before and after MAD.  
Finally, adding the industry index return to the market model as an extra explanatory 
variable improves the fit of the model, yet the problem with adding the industry index return 
to the model is that if a certain industry index is heavily influenced by a small number of 
firms, price reactions surrounding announcements by these firms will turn up in the industry 
index, which will cause these announcements not to be associated with high abnormal returns, 
although the price reactions are caused by them. 
 
7. Discussion and concluding remarks 
This paper has evaluated the effects of the transfer of supervision of the publication of 
price-sensitive information by companies listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. The first 
hypothesis  is  that  MAD  has  decreased  the  cumulative  average  abnormal  return  and 
cumulative average abnormal volume prior to the public release of news announcements. The 
results are inconclusive for large and medium sized firms, whereas the hypothesis cannot be 
rejected for small firms. This is in line with what is found for the effects of the US Regulation 
Fair Disclosure, where the effects are most pronounced for small firms (see Collver, 2007, for 
a discussion). Presenting the results for different types of corporate news announcements, the 
results  show  that  the  market  is  cleaner  for  Alliances/M&A  announcements.  For 
announcements of this type, containing good news, the suspicious pre-announcement run-up 
observed before 1 October 2005 is not longer present afterwards. 
An important note to these results presented is the dependence of certain characteristics 
of the corporate news announcements to the supervisor. The type of announcement is not 
independent of the supervisor, nor is the cap size of the firm publishing the announcement. 
Therefore  the  analysis  is  applied  to  cap  sizes  separately  and  to  announcement  types 
separately. The results are only significant for small cap firms and for announcements of the 
type  Alliances/M&A,  indicating  that  the  new  regulation  improves  the  cleanliness  of  the 
market for these samples. However, an untabulated test of independence between these two 
characteristics shows that the null hypothesis of independence is rejected after MAD at the 1 
percent  level,  and  before  MAD  at  the  10  percent  level.  Looking  at  numbers  of  
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announcements, 21 percent of small cap announcements (76 out of 361) in the period after 
MAD are of the type Alliances/M&A, whereas this share is only 10 percent (25/257) prior to 
the new regulation. Further research has to determine whether the results depend on cap size 
or on announcement type, with the results here being a strong first-stage signal. 
With the observation that the number of announcements increased after 1 October 2005 
the question arose if the information content of these announcements was still as high as 
before.  The  results  from  the  analyses  presented  in  this  paper  lead  to  the  rejection  of 
Hypothesis  2,  that  there  is  less  information  per  press  announcement,  meaning  that  the 
information level of announcements after MAD has not decreased. Although the difference in 
the absolute AARs before and after MAD is found not to be significant, in most cases the 
absolute  AARs  are  actually  larger  afterwards,  indicating  that  announcements  are  more 
informative since MAD. 
Hallock and Mashayekhi (2003) investigate whether news announcements have become 
less  newsworthy  over  the  period  1970-2000.  He  actually  finds  that  for  earnings 
announcements the share price reaction around the announcement date has increased over the 
years.  If  this  trend  also  applies  to  the  Amsterdam  Stock  Exchange,  it  becomes  less 
straightforward  to  interpret  the  results  in  this  paper.  The  increase  observed  in  the 
announcement day absolute abnormal return after the shift in supervision might then not be a 
result of the change in regime, but rather the result of a positive time-trend in the share price 
reaction  to  news  announcements.  Further  research  has  to  determine  whether  or  not  this 
upward trend is large enough to nullify or even reverse the results obtained in this paper. The 
returns then have to be corrected for this upward trend and the information content of releases 
needs to be re-evaluated. 
The conclusions regarding the information content of releases might be biased for another 
reason. If the increase in the number of announcements after the implementation of MAD 
really is only temporary, the period over which to apply the analysis should not include this 
period of adaptation to the new regulation. Given that news announcements do not contain 
less information using the period analysed in this paper, removing the adaptation period, 
which  is  associated  with  more  and  possibly  less  informative  announcements,  will  only 
strengthen the confidence with which the hypothesis is rejected. The results using a post-
adaptation period are even likely to be consistent with a hypothesis that news announcements 
are more informative after MAD.  
Even though the amount of suspicious trading is lower after MAD, the 30-day run-up 
CAARs are significant in most cases, even after the change in regulation. This significant run- 
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up is an indicator for the presence of information leakage and illegal insider trading, but it 
does not allow for a strong conclusion regarding the extent of the problem. Elliott, Morse and 
Richardson (1984) investigate the issue of insider trading from a different perspective. With 
trading behaviour by corporate insiders being found to be profitable, they test whether this 
profitable trading by insiders in general is related to the public release of information. They 
show that most insider trading does not seem related to news announcements. Meulbroek 
(1992) shows that less than half of the pre-announcement stock price run-up observed before 
takeovers occurs on insider trading days. This means that although half of the run-up seems to 
be caused by corporate insiders, investors who are not obliged to register their trades cause 
the other half. Sanders and Zdanowicz (1992) find that the target firm stock price run-up 
found by other researchers begins prior to the public news announcement, which gives rise to 
the suspicion of use of non-public information and hence of illegal insider trading. However, 
they also find that this run-up only starts after an unpublicised initiation of the transaction. 
A final issue worth noting and worth further investigation is that of clustering, which was 
briefly discussed in Section 6. If an announcement is preceded by another announcement, the 
price  reaction  to  this  first  announcement  will  show  up  in  the  pre-announcement  run-up 
periods for the firm at hand. This problem probably extends beyond the firm level. A firm’s 
stock  price  can  also  be  influenced  by  announcements  made  by  other  firms.  Within  the 
financial industry, for example, an announcement by Bank1 might have an effect on the stock 
price of Bank2. If this announcement is followed by an announcement by Bank2, Bank2 will 
show significant pre-announcement abnormal returns. In terms of the analysis applied here, 
this would lead to a suspicion of illegal insider trading, whereas the run-up was actually 
caused by the announcement by Bank1. This problem has partially been taken care of by 
adding the industry index as a factor in the market model (Section 6.3). Further research is 
necessary to investigate the extent to which this affects the results from this analysis. 
Also, clustering of announcements could lead to an under- or overestimation of the pre-
announcement run-up and thus influence the conclusions regarding the prevalence of illegal 
insider trading on the Amsterdam stock market. If insiders trade on information to be released 
in future news announcements, the detection of this illegal insider trading will depend on 
other  announcements  by  the  same  firm  within  the  30-day  pre-announcement  period.  If  it 
concerns  a  good  news  announcement,  run-up  CAR  will  be  positive  in  the  case  of  illegal 
insider trading, and if in the run-up period another good news announcement occurs, the run-
up CAR will be even larger, increasing the significance of the run-up. However, if a bad news 
announcement occurs in that same run-up period, the positive run-up caused by the illegal  
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insider trading will be diminished by the market reaction to the bad news announcement, 
thereby decreasing the detection of illegal insider trading. If the shares of good news and bad 
news  announcements  present  in  the  30-day  run-up  period  are  equal  and  if  the  issue  of 
clustering is comparable in both periods, the effect of increased and decreased probability of 
detection will average out when taking the average CARs over the total samples. However, if 
these conditions do not hold, the results presented here are biased due to the bias present in 
the clustering of announcements. 
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Appendix I 
The  table  below  gives  the  number  of  announcements  that  have  been  released  by  an 
individual security within different capitalization sizes and within different time periods. For 
example, the first security in the list (Aalberts) published 11 announcements in the 15 months 
prior to MAD coming into effect. At the time of publication of these 11 announcements, 
Aalberts was classified as a mid cap. It also released 11 announcements in the 15 months 
following  1  October  2005.  At  the  time  of  their  release,  for  2  of  these  11  Aalberts  was 
classified as a mid cap, whereas for the other 9, it was classified as a large cap. 
 
Table A1. Number of Announcements by Security, by Compartment, and before and after MAD 
    Large Cap  Mid Cap  Small Cap   
Name  ISIN  Before  After  Before  After  Before  After  Total 
AALBERTS INDUSTR  NL0000331346  0  9  11  2  0  0  22 
ABN AMRO HOLDING  NL0000301109  129  61  0  0  0  0  190 
ACCELL GROUP  NL0000350106  1  0  0  8  4  2  15 
AEGON  NL0000303709  43  30  0  0  0  0  73 
AHOLD KON  NL0000331817  59  36  0  0  0  0  95 
AIR FRANCE -KLM  FR0000031122  29  17  0  0  0  0  46 
AIRSPRAY NV  NL0000333557  0  0  0  0  6  7  13 
AJAX  NL0000018034  0  0  84  63  0  0  147 
AKZO NOBEL  NL0000009132  34  48  0  0  0  0  82 
AMSTELLAND MDC NV  NL0000389799  0  0  39  15  0  0  54 
AMSTERDAM COMMOD.  NL0000313286  0  0  0  0  3  6  9 
AND INTERNATIONAL  NL0000430106  0  0  0  0  0  6  6 
ANTONOV  GB00B03THB32  5  0  0  0  0  1  6 
ARCADIS  NL0000358554  0  1  16  38  0  0  55 
ARCELOR MITTAL  NL0000361947  24  47  0  0  0  0  71 
ASM INTERNATIONAL  NL0000334118  0  0  27  38  0  0  65 
ASML HOLDING  NL0000334365  17  30  0  0  0  0  47 
ATHLON GROEP NV  NL0000380210  0  0  7  8  0  0  15 
BALLAST NEDAM  NL0000336543  0  0  0  14  15  1  30 
BAM GROEP KON  NL0000337319  6  41  29  12  0  0  88 
BATENBURG BEHEER  NL0000337657  0  0  0  0  0  5  5 
BE SEMICONDUCTOR  NL0000339760  0  0  0  0  16  13  29 
BETER BED  NL0000339703  0  0  0  6  3  1  10 
BINCKBANK  NL0000335578  0  0  1  10  15  4  30 
BLUE FOX ENTERPRSE  NL0000340222  0  0  0  0  6  13  19 
BOSKALIS WESTMIN  NL0000341485  0  17  7  5  0  0  29 
BRUNEL INTERNAT  NL0000343432  0  0  6  12  0  0  18 
BUHRMANN  NL0000343135  15  17  0  0  0  0  32 
CORIO  NL0000288967  22  17  0  0  0  0  39 
CORUS GROUP  GB00B127GF29  66  79  0  0  0  0  145 
CROWN VAN GELDER  NL0000345452  0  0  0  0  1  6  7 
CRUCELL  NL0000358562  0  0  66  68  0  0  134 
CSM  NL0000344265  28  24  0  0  0  0  52 
CTAC  NL0000345577  0  0  0  0  3  17  20 
DE VRIES ROBBE GRP  NL0000370294  0  0  2  2  0  9  13 
DIM VASTGOED  NL0000284750  0  0  0  0  35  38  73 
 
  
  34 
Table A1. Number of Announcements by Security, by Compartment, and before and after MAD 
(continued) 
    Large Cap  Mid Cap  Small Cap   
Name  ISIN  Before  After  Before  After  Before  After  Total 
DOC DATA  NL0000345627  0  0  0  0  0  11  11 
DPA FLEX GROUP  NL0000347318  0  0  0  0  0  3  3 
DRAKA HOLDING  NL0000347813  0  0  18  10  0  0  28 
DSM KON  NL0000009827  28  55  0  0  0  0  83 
ECONOSTO KON  NL0000349033  0  0  0  0  1  6  7 
ERIKS GROEP  NL0000350387  0  0  0  7  1  1  9 
EUROCOMM. PROP CD  NL0000288876  0  11  9  3  0  0  23 
EXACT HOLDING  NL0000350361  0  0  6  15  0  0  21 
FORNIX BIOSCIENCES  NL0000439990  0  0  0  0  9  7  16 
FORTIS  BE0003801181  41  76  0  0  0  0  117 
FUGRO  NL0000352565  0  19  21  4  0  0  44 
GALAPAGOS  BE0003818359  0  0  0  0  0  25  25 
GAMMA HOLDING  NL0000355824  0  0  0  3  0  0  3 
GROLSCH KON  NL0000354793  0  0  9  11  0  0  20 
GRONTMIJ  NL0000441756  0  0  9  14  0  0  23 
HAGEMEYER  NL0000355477  0  10  19  5  0  0  34 
HAL TRUST  BMG455841020  1  0  0  1  0  1  3 
HEIJMANS  NL0000341931  0  0  25  43  0  0  68 
HEINEKEN  NL0000009165  31  13  0  0  0  0  44 
HEINEKEN HOLDING  NL0000008977  3  5  0  0  0  0  8 
HUNTER DOUGLAS  ANN4327C1220  18  12  0  0  0  0  30 
ICT AUTOMATISERING  NL0000359537  0  0  0  0  5  21  26 
IMTECH  NL0000361269  0  0  35  42  0  0  77 
ING GROEP  NL0000303576  1  0  0  0  0  0  1 
ING GROEP  NL0000303600  81  44  0  0  0  0  125 
INNOCONCEPTS  NL0000361145  0  0  0  6  11  2  19 
JETIX EUROPE  NL0000352524  8  4  0  0  0  0  12 
KARDAN  NL0000113652  0  0  0  34  9  13  56 
KAS BANK  NL0000362648  0  0  22  24  0  0  46 
KONINKLIJKE FRANS MAAS 
GROEP NV 
NL0000366649  0  0  0  3  0  0  3 
KPN KON  NL0000009082  75  50  0  0  0  0  125 
LAURUS  NL0000340776  0  0  19  36  0  0  55 
LOGICACMG  GB0005227086  19  32  0  0  0  0  51 
MACINTOSH RETAIL  NL0000367993  0  0  3  9  0  0  12 
MCGREGOR FASHION 
GROUP NV 
NL0000368124  0  0  0  0  2  7  9 
NEDAP  NL0000371243  0  0  2  4  0  0  6 
NEWAYS ELECTRONICS  NL0000440618  0  0  0  0  0  6  6 
NIEUWE STEEN INV  NL0000292324  0  0  6  8  0  0  14 
NOKIA  FI0009000681  0  0  0  0  0  1  1 
NUMICO  NL0000375616  24  24  0  0  0  0  48 
NUTRECO  NL0000375400  0  16  23  5  0  0  44 
OCE  NL0000354934  0  16  11  11  0  0  38 
ORANJEWOUD A  NL0000370419  0  0  0  0  0  7  7 
ORDINA  NL0000440584  0  0  25  21  0  0  46 
PHARMING GROUP  NL0000377018  0  0  0  24  33  9  66 
PHILIPS KON  NL0000009538  68  49  0  0  0  1  118 
PUNCH TECHNIX  NL0000378768  0  0  0  0  4  3  7 
QURIUS  NL0000368140  0  0  0  0  0  1  1 
RANDSTAD  NL0000379121  16  21  0  0  0  0  37 
REED ELSEVIER  NL0000349488  15  63  0  0  0  0  78 
RODAMCO EUROPE  NL0000289320  30  30  0  0  0  0  60 
ROOD TESTHOUSE  NL0000440477  0  0  0  0  11  7  18 
ROYAL DUTCH SHELLA  GB00B03MLX29  0  178  0  0  0  0  178 
ROYAL DUTCH SHELLB  GB00B03MM408  0  1  0  0  0  0  1 
RT COMPANY  NL0000371623  0  0  0  0  0  5  5  
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Table A1. Number of Announcements by Security, by Compartment, and before and after MAD 
(continued) 
    Large Cap  Mid Cap  Small Cap   
Name  ISIN  Before  After  Before  After  Before  After  Total 
SAMAS NV  NL0000381507  0  0  0  7  7  4  18 
SBM OFFSHORE  NL0000360618  0  9  0  0  0  0  9 
SEAGULL  NL0000381416  0  0  0  0  10  39  49 
SIMAC TECHNIEK  NL0000441616  0  0  0  0  1  6  7 
SMIT INTERNATIONAL  NL0000383800  0  0  0  13  0  0  13 
SOPHEON  GB0006932171  4  0  0  0  0  1  5 
SPYKER CARS  NL0000380830  0  0  0  0  0  8  8 
STERN GROEP  NL0000336303  0  0  0  0  0  8  8 
STORK  NL0000390672  0  44  37  8  0  0  89 
TELEGRAAF MEDIA GR  NL0000386605  0  18  1  0  0  0  19 
TEN CATE  NL0000375749  0  0  8  26  0  0  34 
TIE HOLDING  NL0000386985  0  0  0  0  27  18  45 
TISCALI  IT0001453924  3  0  0  0  0  1  4 
TKH GROUP  NL0000387652  0  0  10  8  0  0  18 
TNT  NL0000009066  0  140  0  0  0  1  141 
TOMTOM  NL0000387058  0  24  0  0  0  0  24 
TULIP COMPUTERS  NL0000387330  0  0  0  0  19  9  28 
UNILEVER  NL0000009355  30  72  0  0  0  0  102 
UNIT 4 AGRESSO  NL0000389096  0  0  11  10  0  0  21 
UNIVAR  NL0000388809  0  7  12  2  0  0  21 
USG PEOPLE  NL0000354488  0  0  24  18  0  0  42 
VAN DER MOOLEN  NL0000370179  0  0  11  14  0  0  25 
VAN LANSCHOT  NL0000302636  0  0  2  33  0  0  35 
VASTNED OFF/IND  NL0000288934  0  0  14  19  0  0  33 
VASTNED RETAIL  NL0000288918  0  0  17  22  0  0  39 
VEDIOR  NL0000390854  20  23  0  0  0  0  43 
VERSATEL  NL0000391266  0  0  29  23  0  0  52 
VNU NV  NL0000389872  28  29  0  0  0  0  57 
VOPAK  NL0000393007  0  13  18  4  0  0  35 
WEGENER  NL0000394567  0  0  1  18  0  0  19 
WERELDHAVE  NL0000289213  10  8  0  0  0  0  18 
WESSANEN KON  NL0000395317  0  0  17  12  0  0  29 
WOLTERS KLUWER  NL0000395903  46  43  0  0  0  0  89 
Total    1,078  1,633  769  881  257  361  4,979 
 
Depending on the composition of the total number of announcements released by a single 
security, its daily volume is included in either one of the three market volume indices or in 
none at all. If the share of its total announcements published within a single cap size group is 
larger than 95 percent, the daily volume of that listing is used in the construction of the 
market volume index for that cap size. Table A2 tabulates which industries are used in the 
construction of the three market volume indices.  
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Table A2. Securities Included in Market Volume Indices 
Volume Index Large Caps  Volume Index Mid Caps  Volume Index Small Caps 
ABN AMRO HOLDING  AJAX  AIRSPRAY NV 
AEGON  AMSTELLAND MDC NV  AMSTERDAM COMMOD. 
AHOLD KON  ARCADIS  AND INTERNATIONAL 
AIR FRANCE -KLM  ASM INTERNATIONAL  BATENBURG BEHEER 
AKZO NOBEL  ATHLON GROEP NV  BE SEMICONDUCTOR 
ARCELOR MITTAL  BRUNEL INTERNAT  BLUE FOX ENTERPRSE 
ASML HOLDING  CRUCELL  CROWN VAN GELDER 
BUHRMANN  DRAKA HOLDING  CTAC 
CORIO  EXACT HOLDING  DIM VASTGOED 
CORUS GROUP  GAMMA HOLDING  DOC DATA 
CSM  GROLSCH KON  DPA FLEX GROUP 
DSM KON  GRONTMIJ  ECONOSTO KON 
FORTIS  HEIJMANS  FORNIX BIOSCIENCES 
HEINEKEN  IMTECH  GALAPAGOS 
HEINEKEN HOLDING  KAS BANK  ICT AUTOMATISERING 
HUNTER DOUGLAS  KONINKLIJKE FRANS MAAS 
GROEP NV 
MCGREGOR FASHION GROUP NV 
ING GROEP  LAURUS  NEWAYS ELECTRONICS 
ING GROEP  MACINTOSH RETAIL  NOKIA 
JETIX EUROPE  NEDAP  ORANJEWOUD A 
KPN KON  NIEUWE STEEN INV  PUNCH TECHNIX 
LOGICACMG  ORDINA  QURIUS 
NUMICO  SMIT INTERNATIONAL  ROOD TESTHOUSE 
PHILIPS KON  TEN CATE  RT COMPANY 
RANDSTAD  TKH GROUP  SEAGULL 
REED ELSEVIER  UNIT 4 AGRESSO  SIMAC TECHNIEK 
RODAMCO EUROPE  USG PEOPLE  SPYKER CARS 
ROYAL DUTCH SHELLA  VAN DER MOOLEN  STERN GROEP 
ROYAL DUTCH SHELLB  VAN LANSCHOT  TIE HOLDING 
SBM OFFSHORE  VASTNED OFF/IND  TULIP COMPUTERS 
TNT  VASTNED RETAIL   
TOMTOM  VERSATEL   
UNILEVER  WEGENER   
VEDIOR  WESSANEN KON   
VNU NV     
WERELDHAVE     
WOLTERS KLUWER      
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Appendix II 
Table A3. Division of Announcements in Euronext Corporate News Database in 9 Announcement Types  
Announcement Type  Topics  Before  After  Total 
Alliances/M&A  Alliances and agreements  0  7  7 
 
Alliances and agreements Other subject Takeover bids Joint venture 
Mergers, Acquisitions, Transfers  40  3  43 
 
Alliances and agreements Takeover bids Joint venture Mergers, 
Acquisitions, Transfers  187  524  711 
  Joint venture  0  22  22 
  Joint venture Mergers, Acquisitions, Transfers  0  1  1 
  Mergers, Acquisitions, Transfers  0  13  13 
  Takeover bids  0  4  4 
Alliances/M&A Total  227  574  801 
Sales  Sales  68  99  167 
  Sales Other subject  29  0  29 
Sales Total  97  99  196 
Share introductions 
and issues 
Other subject Share introductions and issues  0  2  2 
  Share introductions and issues  17  481  498 
Share introductions and issues Total  17  483  500 
Commercial 
operation 
Commercial operation  0  8  8 
  Commercial operation Other subject  0  1  1 
  New contracts  0  1  1 
  Products and services Commercial operation New contracts Other subject  53  1  54 
  Products and services Commercial operation New contracts  72  97  169 
Commercial operation Total  125  108  233 
Income  Other subject Products and services Income  163  5  168 
  Other subject Products and services Income Commerciële 
aankondigingen  
2  0  2 
  Products and services Income  574  772  1,346 
  Products and services Income Commerciële aankondigingen   1  0  1 
Income Total  740  777  1,517 
Corporate life  Corporate life  0  1  1 
  Journal/Appointments  0  7  7 
  Journal/Appointments Corporate life  18  152  170 
  Journal/Appointments Other subject Corporate life  2  1  3 
  Other subject Journal/Appointments Corporate life  1  0  1 
Corporate life Total  21  161  182 
Board/General 
Meeting 
General Meeting/Board Meeting  87  77  164 
  General Meeting/Board Meeting Other subject  27  1  28 
 
General Meeting/Board Meeting Other subject Products and services 
Income  2  0  2 
  Other subject General Meeting/Board Meeting  1  0  1 
Board/General Meeting Total  117  78  195 
Meetings/Events  Meetings/Events  14  26  40 
  Meetings/Events Other subject  6  0  6 
  Other subject Meetings/Events  1  0  1 
Meetings/Events Total  21  26  47 
Other  (blank)  1  2  3 
  Change in capital  0  1  1 
  New establishment  0  1  1 
  Other financial transaction  0  5  5 
  Other subject  738  554  1,292 
  Other subject Change in capital  0  1  1 
  Products and services  0  3  3 
 
Sales Alliances and agreements Takeover bids Joint venture Mergers, 
Acquisitions, Transfers  0  1  1 
  Trends, analyses  0  1  1 
Other Total  739  569  1,308 
Total  2,104  2,875  4,979 
  
  38 




Table 1. Number of Announcements by Capitalization and Supervisor 
  Market Abuse Directive   
Capitalization  Before  After  Total 
Large  1,078  1,633  2,711 
Mid  769  881  1,650 
Small  257  361  618 
Total  2,104  2,875  4,979 
 
 
Table 2. Number of Announcements by Announcement Type and Supervisor 
  Market Abuse Directive   
Announcement Type  Before  After  Total 
Alliances/M&A  227  574  801 
Sales  97  99  196 
Share introduction and issues  17  483  500 
Commercial Operation  125  108  233 
Income  740  777  1,517 
Corporate Life  21  161  182 
Board/General Meeting  117  78  195 
Meetings/Events  21  26  47 
Other  739  569  1,308 
Total  2,104  2,875  4,979 
 
Table 3. Number of Announcements by Weekday and Supervisor 
  Market Abuse Directive   
Weekday  Before  After  Total 
Monday  348  505  853 
Tuesday  396  544  940 
Wednesday  451  641  1,092 
Thursday  471  620  1,091 
Friday  438  565  1,003 
Total  2,104  2,875  4,979 
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Table 4. Means of Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
CUMULATIVE AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS 
A. BAD NEWS ANNOUNCEMENTS 
    TOTAL  LARGE CAPS  MID CAPS  SMALL CAPS 
    mean  se  mean  se  mean  se  mean  se 
30-day run-up  Before  -2.82***  0.29  -2.27***  0.30  -2.46***  0.46  -5.93***  1.39 
  After  -1.96***  0.23  -1.54***  0.27  -3.26***  0.47  -0.67  0.72 
  Difference  -0.86**  0.37  -0.73*  0.41  0.80  0.67  -5.26***  1.47 
5-day run-up  Before  -1.66***  0.10  -1.29***  0.09  -1.85***  0.18  -2.62***  0.44 
  After  -1.51***  0.08  -1.39***  0.09  -1.81***  0.16  -1.34***  0.24 
  Difference  -0.14  0.12  0.10  0.13  -0.04  0.24  -1.28***  0.47 
day 0 aar  Before  -0.51***  0.07  -0.40***  0.07  -0.68***  0.12  -0.47  0.36 
  After  -0.61***  0.06  -0.55***  0.07  -0.57***  0.12  -0.97***  0.22 
  Difference  0.10  0.09  0.15  0.10  -0.11  0.17  0.50  0.40 
5-day post caar  Before  -2.18***  0.11  -1.54***  0.11  -2.42***  0.19  -4.05***  0.48 
  After  -2.18***  0.09  -1.85***  0.11  -2.42***  0.19  -3.07***  0.30 
  Difference  0.00  0.14  0.31*  0.16  0.00  0.28  -0.98*  0.54 
                   
Total  2,535    1,383    823    329   
Before  1,073    560    370    143   
Number of 
announcements 
After  1,462    823    453    186   
B. GOOD NEWS ANNOUNCEMENTS 
    TOTAL  LARGE CAPS  MID CAPS  SMALL CAPS 
    mean  se  mean  se  mean  se  mean  se 
30-day run-up  Before  2.22***  0.31  1.39***  0.30  3.35***  0.52  1.97  1.57 
  After  2.00***  0.23  2.41***  0.27  1.23***  0.46  1.92**  0.74 
  Difference  0.22  0.37  -1.02**  0.41  2.12***  0.70  0.05  1.57 
5-day run-up  Before  1.79***  0.11  1.23***  0.11  2.11***  0.17  3.26***  0.64 
  After  1.80***  0.09  1.64***  0.10  1.78***  0.18  2.61***  0.35 
  Difference  -0.01  0.14  -0.41***  0.15  0.32  0.25  0.65  0.68 
day 0 aar  Before  0.87***  0.08  0.47***  0.07  1.00***  0.13  2.19***  0.44 
  After  1.02***  0.07  0.64***  0.07  1.17***  0.13  2.41***  0.34 
  Difference  -0.16  0.11  -0.17*  0.10  -0.17  0.18  -0.23  0.55 
5-day post caar  Before  2.00***  0.12  1.47***  0.11  2.13***  0.19  3.92***  0.67 
  After  2.16***  0.10  1.73***  0.11  2.48***  0.21  3.37***  0.44 
  Difference  -0.17  0.16  -0.26*  0.16  -0.35  0.29  0.54  0.77 
                   
Total  2,444    1,328    827    289   
Before  1,031    518    399    114   
Number of 
announcements 
After  1,413    810    428    175   
Cumulative average abnormal returns in percentage points, where Difference is Before minus After 
Announcement considered bad news if the CAR from t-5 to and including t+4 is smaller than zero, good news otherwise (t=0 
being the day of the press release) 
* Significant at 10 percent level 
** Significant at 5 percent level 
*** Significant at 1 percent level 
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Table 5. Means of Cumulative Average Abnormal Volumes 
CUMULATIVE AVERAGE ABNORMAL VOLUMES 
A. BAD NEWS ANNOUNCEMENTS 
    TOTAL  LARGE CAPS  MID CAPS  SMALL CAPS 
    mean  se  mean  se  Mean  se  mean  se 
30-day run-up  Before  0.260  0.222  -0.239  0.208  1.222***  0.442  -0.276  0.885 
  After  0.388*  0.201  0.120  0.193  1.721***  0.396  -1.674*  0.893 
  Difference  -0.128  0.302  -0.359  0.291  -0.499  0.593  1.397  1.280 
5-day run-up  Before  0.097*  0.055  0.051  0.057  0.108  0.108  0.250  0.212 
  After  0.026  0.054  -0.005  0.051  0.296***  0.099  -0.494*  0.271 
  Difference  0.071  0.079  0.056  0.077  -0.188  0.147  0.743**  0.361 
day 0 aav  Before  0.302***  0.027  0.164***  0.026  0.353***  0.052  0.710***  0.107 
  After  0.290***  0.023  0.164***  0.022  0.390***  0.048  0.608***  0.099 
  Difference  0.012  0.036  0.000  0.034  -0.037  0.071  0.101  0.147 
5-day post caav  Before  0.322***  0.038  0.201***  0.036  0.366***  0.075  0.681***  0.149 
  After  0.301***  0.034  0.148***  0.032  0.447***  0.069  0.621***  0.151 
  Difference  0.021  0.051  0.053  0.048  -0.081  0.102  0.060  0.216 
                   
Total  2,535    1,383    823    329   
Before  1,073    560    370    143   
Number of 
announcements 
After  1,462    823    453    186   
B. GOOD NEWS ANNOUNCEMENTS 
    TOTAL  LARGE CAPS  MID CAPS  SMALL CAPS 
    mean  se  mean  se  Mean  se  mean  se 
30-day run-up  Before  1.110***  0.249  -0.522***  0.194  2.261***  0.445  4.502***  1.278 
  After  1.145***  0.203  1.137***  0.183  2.001***  0.359  -0.913  1.081 
  Difference  -0.034  0.319  -1.659***  0.277  0.260  0.568  5.415***  1.690 
5-day run-up  Before  0.423***  0.067  -0.050  0.052  0.744***  0.119  1.447***  0.338 
  After  0.390***  0.055  0.361***  0.051  0.608***  0.104  -0.004  0.272 
  Difference  0.032  0.086  -0.411***  0.077  0.136  0.157  1.451***  0.433 
day 0 aav  Before  0.398***  0.027  0.145***  0.026  0.553***  0.047  1.007***  0.110 
  After  0.422***  0.024  0.190***  0.021  0.614***  0.049  1.021***  0.100 
  Difference  -0.023  0.036  -0.045  0.033  -0.061  0.068  -0.014  0.152 
5-day post caav  Before  0.521***  0.040  0.144***  0.035  0.771***  0.071  1.354***  0.177 
  After  0.542***  0.036  0.257***  0.030  0.809***  0.072  1.210***  0.166 
  Difference  -0.022  0.054  -0.113**  0.047  -0.038  0.101  0.144  0.251 
                   
Total  2,444    1,328    827    289   
Before  1,031    518    399    114   
Number of 
announcements 
After  1,413    810    428    175   
Cumulative average abnormal volumes (ln(1+Volume)), where Difference is Before minus After 
Announcement considered bad news if the CAR from t-5 to and including t+4 is smaller than zero, good news otherwise (t=0 
being the day of the press release) 
* Significant at 10 percent level 
** Significant at 5 percent level 
*** Significant at 1 percent level  
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Table 6. Means of Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns: Statistics by Announcement Type 
CUMULATIVE AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS: BY ANNOUNCEMENT TYPE 
A. BAD NEWS ANNOUNCEMENTS 
    ALLIANCES/M&A  SALES  COMMERCIAL 
OPERATION  INCOME 
    mean  se  mean  se  mean  se  mean  se 
30-day run-up  Before  -4.33***  0.92  -0.82  1.08  -1.72  1.32  -2.12***  0.52 
  After  -3.17***  0.53  -0.85  1.54  -2.65***  0.93  -2.21***  0.46 
  Difference  -1.16  1.03  0.03  1.89  0.93  1.69  0.09  0.69 
5-day run-up  Before  -1.91***  0.25  -1.23**  0.54  -1.94***  0.36  -1.54***  0.17 
  After  -2.08***  0.17  -2.06***  0.66  -1.76***  0.32  -1.12***  0.15 
  Difference  0.17  0.32  0.83  0.86  -0.19  0.49  -0.43*  0.23 
day 0 aar  Before  0.01  0.17  -0.01  0.19  0.02  0.21  -0.77***  0.14 
  After  -0.24***  0.09  -0.04  0.28  -0.10  0.18  -1.32***  0.16 
  Difference  0.25  0.18  0.03  0.34  0.12  0.28  0.55**  0.22 
5-day post caar  Before  -1.57***  0.36  -1.59***  0.39  -1.18***  0.32  -2.56***  0.19 
  After  -1.97***  0.19  -1.16**  0.45  -0.68***  0.23  -3.25***  0.22 
  Difference  0.40  0.38  -0.43  0.60  -0.50  0.41  0.69**  0.29 
                   
Total  404    92    111    804   
Before  109    45    61    398   
Number of 
announcements 
After  295    47    50    406   
B. GOOD NEWS ANNOUNCEMENTS 
    ALLIANCES/M&A  SALES  COMMERCIAL 
OPERATION  INCOME 
    mean  se  mean  se  mean  se  mean  se 
30-day run-up  Before  3.74***  1.04  1.78*  0.96  1.31  1.15  2.18***  0.51 
  After  -0.20  0.54  2.01*  1.08  1.73  1.38  2.54***  0.42 
  Difference  3.93***  1.07  -0.22  1.44  -0.42  1.78  -0.36  0.66 
5-day run-up  Before  1.76***  0.27  1.60***  0.40  1.97***  0.37  1.64***  0.21 
  After  1.50***  0.18  1.92***  0.69  2.46***  0.48  2.01***  0.21 
  Difference  0.26  0.33  -0.32  0.80  -0.49  0.60  -0.37  0.29 
day 0 aar  Before  1.00***  0.27  0.43**  0.18  0.89***  0.22  1.14***  0.16 
  After  1.11***  0.16  1.03***  0.25  0.74**  0.33  1.55***  0.17 
  Difference  -0.12  0.30  -0.60*  0.31  0.15  0.39  -0.41*  0.24 
5-day post caar  Before  2.24***  0.33  1.08***  0.25  2.43***  0.79  2.35***  0.24 
  After  2.42***  0.23  2.36***  0.41  1.39***  0.45  2.50***  0.22 
  Difference  -0.18  0.42  -1.28*  0.48  1.04  0.93  -0.15  0.32 
                   
Total  397    104    64    713   
Before  118    52    58    342   
Number of 
announcements 
After  279    52    122    371   
Cumulative average abnormal returns in percentage points, where Difference is Before minus After 
Announcement considered bad news if the CAR from t-5 to and including t+4 is smaller than zero, good news otherwise (t=0 
being the day of the press release) 
* Significant at 10 percent level 
** Significant at 5 percent level 
*** Significant at 1 percent level 
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Table 7. Means of Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns: Statistics by Industry 
CUMULATIVE AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS: BY INDUSTRY 
A. BAD NEWS ANNOUNCEMENTS 
    INDUSTRIALS  CONSUMER 
GOODS 
CONSUMER 
SERVICES  FINANCIALS  TECHNOLOGY 
    mean  se  mean  se  mean  se  mean  se  mean  se 
30-day run-up  Before  -2.30***  0.65  -1.30*  0.72  -2.38***  0.50  -2.19***  0.40  -4.36***  1.23 
  After  -3.28***  0.47  -1.36**  0.53  -2.91***  0.74  -1.95***  0.47  -0.80  0.77 
  Difference  0.98  0.82  0.06  0.87  0.53  0.90  -0.24  0.62  -3.56**  1.39 
5-day run-up  Before  -2.09***  0.31  -1.53***  0.20  -1.43***  0.20  -1.10***  0.12  -2.21***  0.39 
  After  -1.67***  0.16  -1.03***  0.14  -1.45***  0.23  -1.30***  0.16  -1.28***  0.28 
  Difference  -0.42  0.31  -0.50**  0.24  0.03  0.31  0.20  0.20  -0.93**  0.46 
day 0 aar  Before  -0.50**  0.24  -0.45**  0.18  -0.58***  0.13  -0.22**  0.09  -1.04***  0.30 
  After  -0.54***  0.12  -0.72***  0.13  -0.84***  0.17  -0.35***  0.12  -0.97***  0.25 
  Difference  0.04  0.24  0.28  0.22  0.26  0.22  0.13  0.15  -0.07  0.39 
5-day post caar Before  -2.56***  0.30  -1.32***  0.21  -1.77***  0.20  -1.41***  0.16  -3.49***  0.41 
  After  -2.18***  0.18  -1.86***  0.21  -2.29***  0.31  -1.95***  0.22  -3.13***  0.34 
  Difference  -0.39  0.33  0.54*  0.30  0.52  0.37  0.53**  0.27  -0.36  0.53 
                       
Total  541    298    335    526    315   
Before  171    131    169    266    138   
Number of 
announcements 
After  370    167    166    260    177   
B. GOOD NEWS ANNOUNCEMENTS 
    INDUSTRIALS  CONSUMER 
GOODS 
CONSUMER 
SERVICES  FINANCIALS  TECHNOLOGY 
    mean  se  mean  se  mean  se  mean  se  mean  se 
30-day run-up  Before  1.68**  0.68  1.63**  0.74  0.98  0.76  1.76***  0.49  0.98  1.19 
  After  1.51***  0.51  1.69***  0.61  2.04***  0.68  1.94***  0.40  1.89**  0.78 
  Difference  0.18  0.83  -0.06  0.96  -1.06  1.04  -0.18  0.63  -0.91  1.40 
5-day run-up  Before  1.75***  0.26  1.46***  0.30  1.40***  0.26  1.32***  0.21  2.22***  0.33 
  After  1.43***  0.17  1.18***  0.21  1.77***  0.26  1.29***  0.15  2.58***  0.33 
  Difference  0.32  0.30  0.28  0.37  -0.37  0.39  0.04  0.26  -0.36  0.53 
day 0 aar  Before  1.37***  0.25  0.83***  0.18  0.72***  0.18  0.43***  0.10  1.61***  0.39 
  After  1.36***  0.17  1.32***  0.23  0.88***  0.15  0.53***  0.11  1.65***  0.30 
  Difference  0.01  0.30  -0.49*  0.29  -0.15  0.24  -0.10  0.15  -0.04  0.52 
5-day post caar Before  2.39***  0.27  2.20***  0.31  2.03***  0.33  1.38***  0.21  2.76***  0.56 
  After  2.80***  0.24  2.32***  0.32  2.17***  0.32  1.49***  0.16  2.85***  0.40 
  Difference  -0.41  0.37  -0.11  0.44  -0.13  0.47  -0.12  0.27  -0.09  0.70 
                       
Total  493    276    318    556    262   
Before  198    142    127    281    83   
Number of 
announcements 
After  295    134    191    275    179   
Cumulative average abnormal returns in percentage points, where Difference is before minus after 
Announcement considered bad news if the CAR from t-5 to and including t+4 is smaller than zero, good news otherwise (t=0 
being the day of the press release) 
* Significant at 10 percent level 
** Significant at 5 percent level 
*** Significant at 1 percent level 
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Table 8. Number of Announcements by Industry and Capitalization 
  Capitalization   
Industry  Large  Mid  Small  Total 
Industrials  393  568  73  1,034 
Consumer Goods  423  95  56  574 
Consumer Services  395  240  18  653 
Financials  635  323  124  1,082 
Technology  145  175  257  577 
Total  2,711  1,650  618  4,979 
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Table  9.  Means  of  Cumulative  Average  Abnormal  Returns:  Bad/Good  News  Distinction  by  Sign  of 
Announcement Day Abnormal Return 
CUMULATIVE AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS 
A. BAD NEWS ANNOUNCEMENTS 
    TOTAL  LARGE CAPS  MID CAPS  SMALL CAPS 
    mean  se  mean  se  mean  se  mean  se 
30-day run-up  Before  -0.45  0.29  -0.69**  0.31  0.41  0.49  -2.00  1.41 
  After  -0.30  0.24  0.04  0.28  -1.90***  0.50  1.89**  0.76 
  Difference  -0.15  0.38  -0.73*  0.43  2.30***  0.71  -3.89***  1.49 
5-day run-up  Before  0.15  0.11  -0.05  0.11  0.29  0.21  0.62  0.49 
  After  0.25**  0.10  0.11  0.11  0.16  0.21  1.17***  0.37 
  Difference  -0.10  0.15  -0.15  0.16  0.13  0.29  -0.55  0.60 
day 0 aar  Before  -1.38***  0.06  -1.04***  0.06  -1.53***  0.10  -2.39***  0.28 
  After  -1.38***  0.05  -1.11***  0.05  -1.62***  0.10  -2.10***  0.20 
  Difference  0.00  0.08  0.06  0.08  0.08  0.14  -0.28  0.33 
5-day post caar  Before  -1.60***  0.12  -0.94***  0.13  -1.86***  0.21  -3.77***  0.57 
  After  -1.73***  0.10  -1.35***  0.11  -2.03***  0.22  -2.86***  0.39 
  Difference  0.13  0.16  0.41**  0.17  0.17  0.30  -0.91  0.66 
                   
Total  2,464    1,383    787    294   
Before  1,048    550    376    122   
Number of 
announcements 
After  1,416    833    411    172   
B. GOOD NEWS ANNOUNCEMENTS 
    TOTAL  LARGE CAPS  MID CAPS  SMALL CAPS 
    mean  se  mean  se  mean  se  mean  se 
30-day run-up  Before  -0.26  0.33  -0.32  0.31  0.70  0.54  -2.81*  1.59 
  After  0.26  0.23  0.82***  0.27  -0.36  0.46  -0.61  0.70 
  Difference  -0.52  0.39  -1.15***  0.42  1.06  0.70  -2.20  1.58 
5-day run-up  Before  -0.09  0.13  -0.11  0.11  0.12  0.20  -0.59  0.66 
  After  -0.02  0.09  0.11  0.11  -0.26  0.17  0.03  0.30 
  Difference  -0.07  0.15  -0.23  0.16  0.38  0.26  -0.62  0.65 
day 0 aar  Before  1.69***  0.07  1.12***  0.06  1.84***  0.10  3.51***  0.35 
  After  1.71***  0.06  1.24***  0.06  1.93***  0.10  3.20***  0.26 
  Difference  -0.02  0.09  -0.11  0.09  -0.09  0.15  0.31  0.43 
5-day post caar  Before  1.32***  0.13  0.79***  0.12  1.67***  0.20  2.43***  0.63 
  After  1.59***  0.11  1.26***  0.12  1.70***  0.22  2.71***  0.39 
  Difference  -0.27  0.17  -0.47***  0.17  -0.04  0.30  -0.28  0.71 
                   
Total  2,515    1,328    863    324   
Before  1,056    528    393    135   
Number of 
announcements 
After  1,459    800    470    189   
Cumulative average abnormal returns in percentage points, where Difference is before minus after 
Announcement considered bad news if the abnormal return on the day of the announcement is smaller than zero, good news 
otherwise 
* Significant at 10 percent level 
** Significant at 5 percent level 
*** Significant at 1 percent level 
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Table 10. Means of Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns: Unclustered Announcements 
CUMULATIVE AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS 
A. BAD NEWS ANNOUNCEMENTS 
    TOTAL  LARGE CAPS  MID CAPS  SMALL CAPS 
    mean  se  mean  se  mean  se  mean  se 
5-day run-up  Before  -1.69***  0.17  -1.13***  0.18  -1.66***  0.22  -2.78***  0.63 
  After  -1.38***  0.13  -1.28***  0.20  -1.52***  0.23  -1.31***  0.28 
  Difference  -0.31  0.22  0.14  0.27  -0.14  0.33  -1.47**  0.64 
day 0 aar  Before  -0.64***  0.15  -0.58***  0.16  -0.85***  0.20  -0.31  0.51 
  After  -0.91***  0.12  -0.80***  0.16  -0.69***  0.21  -1.49***  0.28 
  Difference  0.27  0.19  0.21  0.23  -0.16  0.30  1.18**  0.55 
5-day post caar  Before  -2.39***  0.19  -1.51***  0.21  -2.54***  0.29  -3.77***  0.60 
  After  -2.74***  0.17  -2.12***  0.21  -2.96***  0.33  -3.50***  0.37 
  Difference  0.35  0.26  0.62  0.31  0.42  0.44  -0.27  0.67 
                   
Total  883    348    350    185   
Before  391    151    160    80   
Number of 
announcements 
After  492    197    190    105   
B. GOOD NEWS ANNOUNCEMENTS 
    TOTAL  LARGE CAPS  MID CAPS  SMALL CAPS 
    mean  se  mean  se  mean  se  mean  se 
5-day run-up  Before  1.94***  0.20  1.54***  0.31  2.06***  0.25  2.55***  0.71 
  After  1.37***  0.15  1.29***  0.17  1.43***  0.27  1.44***  0.40 
  Difference  0.57**  0.24  0.25  0.33  0.64*  0.37  1.11  0.76 
day 0 aar  Before  1.15***  0.16  0.41***  0.15  1.35***  0.21  2.38***  0.77 
  After  1.67***  0.16  1.14***  0.17  1.48***  0.26  3.16***  0.49 
  Difference  -0.52**  0.23  -0.73***  0.24  -0.13  0.33  -0.78  0.87 
5-day post caar  Before  2.27***  0.22  1.49***  0.26  2.38***  0.30  3.92***  0.87 
  After  2.82***  0.20  2.33***  0.24  2.99***  0.35  3.59***  0.54 
  Difference  -0.55*  0.29  -0.84**  0.36  -0.61  0.46  0.34  0.97 
                   
Total  811    334    332    145   
Before  369    138    177    54   
Number of 
announcements 
After  442    196    155    91   
Cumulative average abnormal returns in percentage points, where Difference is before minus after 
Announcement considered bad news if the CAR from t-5 to and including t+4 is smaller than zero, good news otherwise (t=0 
being the day of the press release) 
If there is another announcement by the same firm within the period t-5 to t+4, the announcement is considered clustered and 
thus not included in this analysis 
* Significant at 10 percent level 
** Significant at 5 percent level 
*** Significant at 1 percent level 
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Table 11. Means of Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns: by Industry; with industry index added to 
the market model to predict the abnormal returns 
CUMULATIVE AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS: BY INDUSTRY 
A. BAD NEWS ANNOUNCEMENTS 
   
INDUSTRIALS  CONSUMER 
GOODS 
CONSUMER 
SERVICES  FINANCIALS  TECHNOLOGY 
    mean  se  mean  se  mean  se  mean  se  mean  se 
30-day run-up  Before  -2.24***  0.67  -1.14  0.73  -2.92***  0.52  -1.63***  0.36  -3.88***  1.20 
  After  -2.16***  0.44  -1.74***  0.51  -3.27***  0.79  -1.71***  0.45  -1.85**  0.80 
  Difference  -0.08  0.78  0.60  0.87  0.35  0.96  0.08  0.57  -2.03  1.40 
5-day run-up  Before  -2.10***  0.30  -1.47***  0.21  -1.50***  0.20  -1.01***  0.11  -2.12***  0.38 
  After  -1.48***  0.15  -1.08***  0.13  -1.55***  0.22  -1.32***  0.16  -1.28***  0.29 
  Difference  -0.62**  0.30  -0.39*  0.23  0.05  0.30  0.31  0.19  -0.83*  0.47 
day 0 aar  Before  -0.56**  0.25  -0.42**  0.18  -0.60***  0.13  -0.20**  0.08  -1.00***  0.29 
  After  -0.52***  0.12  -0.59***  0.13  -0.69***  0.16  -0.38***  0.13  -1.02***  0.26 
  Difference  -0.04  0.25  0.17  0.22  0.09  0.21  0.18  0.15  0.02  0.38 
5-day post caar Before  -2.59***  0.30  -1.30***  0.22  -1.74***  0.20  -1.27***  0.15  -3.20***  0.39 
  After  -2.11***  0.17  -1.75***  0.21  -2.14***  0.30  -1.93***  0.22  -3.09***  0.35 
  Difference  -0.48  0.32  0.45  0.31  0.39  0.36  0.66  0.27  -0.11  0.52 
                       
Total  520    301    346    531    309   
Before  173    128    168    275    139   
Number of 
announcements 
After  347    173    178    256    170   
B. GOOD NEWS ANNOUNCEMENTS 
   
INDUSTRIALS  CONSUMER 
GOODS 
CONSUMER 
SERVICES  FINANCIALS  TECHNOLOGY 
    mean  se  mean  se  mean  se  mean  se  mean  se 
30-day run-up  Before  1.66**  0.65  1.49**  0.73  1.36*  0.74  1.62***  0.49  0.43  1.11 
  After  1.67***  0.47  1.80***  0.62  2.31***  0.67  1.53***  0.43  2.50***  0.72 
  Difference  -0.01  0.78  -0.31  0.97  -0.94  1.01  0.10  0.65  -2.07  1.30 
5-day run-up  Before  1.78***  0.25  1.40***  0.29  1.38***  0.24  1.33***  0.22  1.87***  0.30 
  After  1.42***  0.16  1.27***  0.22  1.95***  0.26  1.31***  0.15  2.51***  0.31 
  Difference  0.36  0.28  0.14  0.37  -0.58  0.37  0.02  0.26  -0.65  0.50 
day 0 aar  Before  1.39***  0.25  0.71***  0.15  0.73***  0.18  0.44***  0.11  1.54***  0.39 
  After  1.27***  0.16  1.18***  0.25  0.81***  0.15  0.54***  0.11  1.55***  0.28 
  Difference  0.11  0.29  -0.48*  0.28  -0.09  0.24  -0.10  0.15  -0.01  0.49 
5-day post caar Before  2.42***  0.27  2.00***  0.29  1.94***  0.30  1.29***  0.22  2.61***  0.53 
  After  2.54***  0.22  2.20***  0.34  2.11***  0.33  1.36***  0.16  2.76***  0.38 
  Difference  -0.13  0.35  -0.20  0.44  -0.18  0.47  -0.07  0.27  -0.15  0.67 
                       
Total  515    273    305    551    270   
Before  197    145    126    272    84   
Number of 
announcements 
After  318    128    179    279    186   
Cumulative average abnormal returns in percentage points, where Difference is before minus after 
Announcement considered bad news if the CAR from t-5 to and including t+4 is smaller than zero, good news otherwise (t=0 
being the day of the press release) 
Both the compartment index and the industry index have been used to predict abnormal returns 
* Significant at 10 percent level 
** Significant at 5 percent level 
*** Significant at 1 percent level 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Difference in Weekly Announcements before and after the Market Abuse Directive 
 
 
Note: The line shows the difference in the number of announcements by week number before and after MAD.   
  48 
































































-30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5





































































-30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5





































































-30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5





































































-30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5







  49 











































-30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5


















































-30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5













































-30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5















































-30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5







  50 














































































-30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5



















































































-30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0



















































































-30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5



















































































-30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0







  51 


























































-30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5































































-30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0































































-30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5































































-30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0































































-30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5







  52 
Figure  6.  Plots  of  Cumulative  Average  Abnormal  Returns:  Bad/Good  News  Distinction  by  Sign  of 
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